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ABSTRACT 
DEMOCRATIC FAILURE: 
TRACKING THE EBB OF DEMOCRACY'S FLOW, 1800-2006 
Sonja E. Sray 
Old Dominion University, 2008 
Director: Dr. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz 
Scant attention has focused on the systematic study of democratic failure. This 
dissertation partially corrects this oversight. Tracing the roots of antidemocratic 
sentiment across the centuries, it first argues that the advance of institutions, fueled by 
underlying shifts in values and innovation in political philosophy, was key to freeing 
democracy from its bondage as a most disparaged form of governance. Focusing on the 
measurable aspects of these institutions, the study focuses on describing patterns of 
behavior when democracies fail. First, it shows that there have been clusters of 
democratic failure. These clusters, or counterwaves, find their roots in ancient 
antidemocratic sentiment with modern ideological twists. The comparison of these 
counterwaves helps illuminate threats to democracy present in antidemocratic ideals that 
have held sway in the international system at varying times. Examining democratic 
failures in high level democracies, mid-level democracies, and low level democracies, it 
shows that democracies by and large fail quickly and dramatically. It highlights the issue 
of repeat offenders, those democracies that repeatedly attempt "rule by the many" even 
when plagued with democratic failure. Finally, it also shows the relevance of the 
deepening of autocracy as it interacts with the idea of the failure of democracy. 
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In the words of Anatole France, "All changes, even the most longed for, have 
their melancholy; for what we leave behind us is a part of ourselves; we must die to one 
life before we can enter another."1 At its heart, this dissertation is about change. While 
France was clearly philosophizing about change impacting individuals, his words seem 
apt for nation states as well. The process of changing one's political power configuration 
is not without angst. This study looks at a particular aspect of change, one in which 
states return to that which they left behind. To be more explicit, this is a study of nation 
states that commit, on some level, to democratic governance only to backslide on their 
commitments. It is the story of nations that, at least on some level, didn't die to one life 
before entering another. 
These renegade democracies cluster together at certain points in history. It's as if 
they are collectively struck by a sort of melancholy with democratic progression, and turn 
their backs on democracy en masse. Little has been said about this collective 
commitment to democratic decline. Instead, attention has focused on democratic 
progression. Samuel Huntington has quite famously described democracy's forward 
march as a historic process of ever increasing waves. He tracks 3 historic waves of 
democracy, each involving more countries than the wave which preceded it. 
This dissertation follows the format requirements of A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses and 
Dissertations 7th edition by Kate L. Turabian. 
1
 Anatole France, http://thinkexist.com/quotation/all_changes-even_the_most_longed_for-
have their/220920.html (accessed October 8, 2008). 
2
 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
2 
Why commit time to study the backward steps of this dance when the forward 
motion seems dominant? Has not Western academia reached the rather solid conclusion 
that democracy is inevitable, except perhaps for certain odd-ball regimes and extremist 
religious cultures? True, the euphoria that immediately followed the Cold War's 
dramatic conclusion has largely evaporated, as a forced to acknowledgement that the 
process of democratic transition and consolidation has not been as Pollyannic as hoped. 
Still, democracy remains the only legitimate form of governance, the evolutionary end 
point, the signpost of a civilization's true arrival. Defeating all comers in the political 
brawl across the centuries, today it is the last man standing. This work focuses on the 
times democracy falters, stumbles, and even falls, because the picture of democracy's 
success can only be understood against the backdrop of its failures. 
Today democracy boasts the power to modify the actions of even the most 
absolute dictator. Even highly autocratic regimes pay twisted homage to democracy by 
holding "elections," which apparently must go on even in the wake of extreme natural 
disasters.4 In some token way even these enemies of democracy confirm its power. Even 
those societies that are not democratic often placate their populations with the succor of 
economic transformation now, promising political transformation later. Few regimes 
indeed dare to say that democracy is a flawed institution. 
In the West democracy has been seen as a key to achieving a more peaceful 
international system. The United States has identified democracy promotion as priority 
number one in the foreign policy arena.5 In fact, all post-Cold war presidents, regardless 
3
 Larry Diamond, "Universal Democracy?" Policy Review 119 (June 2003): 3-25. 
4
 Seth Mydans, "Rulers Keep Grip on Aid as Burmese Cast Votes," New York Times, May 11, 2008. 
5
 Michael McFaul, "Democracy Promotion as a World Value," The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 1 
(Winter 2004-2005): 147-163. 
3 
of party affiliation, have emphasized the promotion of democracy as a key foreign policy 
objective. So drastic is this commitment that even the C.I.A. has apparently been 
realigned to see democracy promotion as a prime objective.6 Meanwhile, the European 
Union has pushed democracy as a necessary precursor for membership. While the 
origins of the EU orbited around economic considerations, nations have been admitted 
into membership when their economic outlook was far from certain.7 Less flexibility, 
however, has been extended to nations with robust economies but damp commitment to 
democracy.8 Democracy has served as the sine quo non for the EU states. 
Nor is democracy confined to the geographic boundaries of Europe and North 
America. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, nations turned to democracy like 
refugees fleeing civil war. As early as the 1970s, Latin American nations turned toward 
democratic reforms as well. African nations, in the wake of colonialism's death, initially 
maintained the democratic institutions of their colonizers. Asia, too, is the home of 
mature democracies. No continent, then, has been left untouched by democracy's 
forward march. 
So again, why bother with democratic decline? Democracy's advance, instead of 
denigrating the need to study democratic decline, instead lends urgency. As the 
international system has more of a stake in democratic progression, it has more of a stake 
in preventing democratic decline. Understanding and describing democratic decline 
William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 231. 
7
 Susan Senior Nello, "Preparing for Enlargement in the European Union: The Tensions between 
Economic and Political Integration," International Political Science Review 23, no. 3 (July 2002): 291 -
317. 
8
 Heather Grabbe, "European Union Conditionality and the 'Acquis Communautaire,"' International 
Political Science Review 23, no. 3 (July 2002): 249-268. 
4 
becomes of vital interest to those who would defend democracy. Only by acquiring a 
greater understanding of the threats to democracy can one truly bolster and defend it. 
The Gap 
Surprisingly, there has been little systematic work in this area. An examination of 
the gap should precede the discussion of the meat of this study. The gap in the literature 
is actually two-fold, existing both in the democratic failure literature as well as in the 
treatment of clusters of democratic failure. This project aims to partially bridge this 
double gap. 
Democratic failure 
It would be incorrect to assert that no one has given thought to why democracies 
falter. There are several extant theories on democracy's demise. Some assert that 
democracy fails when faced with outside security threats.9 It devolves into a type of 
"garrison state" mentality that values security over democracy. Thus, democracy is 
sacrificed at the altar of security when sufficient threats arise. In a slight variation of this 
theme, others assert democracy is a luxury good only afforded by those states without the 
pressures of trying to secure their borders.10 If one has a threatening neighbor, 
democracy is likely to falter. 
By other measures, democratic reforms fail when the elites from the former 
political system are not assimilated into the new democracy, or at least duly compensated 
9
 Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State," The American Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (January 1941): 
455-468. 
10
 In his paper "Defensive Democratization" Kurt Taylor Gaubatz discusses this traditional viewpoint, then 
shows its limitations. Please see Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Defensive Democratization: International 
Relations Theory, Strategic Politicians, and External Incentives for Regime Change," unpublished 
manuscript (Norfolk: Old Dominion University, 2008). 
5 
for sacrificing their power. This can be as simple as failing to ensure a "golden 
parachute" to elites who have much to lose from a transition to democracy or can occur 
when the complexities of the transition are bungled. n Heterogeneity of society has also 
been associated with democratic failure. A society divided into many factions—whether 
ethnic, cultural, political or religious—provides infertile ground for democracy's 
growth.1 
And, of course, there is the cultural argument. Some argue that democracy will 
not flourish in certain environments, simply because the culture is hostile to the ideals 
necessary for democracy. These cultures have not cultivated the necessary "habits of 
the heart" and thus democracy finds a hostile reception. 
Democracy may also falter when it fails to meet up to domestic expectations. 
Democracy is charged with making life better for all who live under it, improving the 
condition of the poor, indeed acting as a savior for any number of problems in society. 
Failure to meet these expectations has been linked with democratic failure in a variant of 
Ted Robert Gurr's theory of the J curve.14 
These works, however, are piecemeal in their approach, selecting a country or 
grouping of countries upon which to base their assertions. Curiously the most prominent 
book on the subject was written by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan nearly 30 years ago, in 
11
 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security 
20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 36-37. 
12
 James Ockey, "Political Parties, Factions, and Corruption in Thailand," Modern Asian Studies 28, no. 1 
(May 1994): 251-277. 
13
 Howard J. Wiarda, The Soul of Latin America: The Cultural and Political Tradition (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2001), 309-343. 
14
 Ted Robert Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," World Politics 20, no. 2 (January 1968): 
245-278. 
the midst of the most sustained forward wave of democratization. Even this tome only 
dealt with selected cases in Latin America and Europe. Since that time, the case study 
approach has dominated.16 The few cross-national analyses that exist deal with regional 
1 7 
considerations and not the system at large. While the in-depth case study analyses and 
regional studies have provided important insights, the lack of macro-level analysis of 
democratic failure across time leaves a gap that needs to be filled. This focus on the trees 
leaves little room for studying the forest. In the case of democratic failure, key findings 
on the deforestation of democracy provide important insights into managing forest health. 
It begins the process of guarding against the forest fires known also as the counterwaves, 
a phenomenon impossible to even detect when focusing exclusively on case studies. 
The counterwaves 
While many of these theories of democratic failure bring insight, they are 
primarily focused on internal dynamics. Perhaps this is only natural since the domestic 
stories are so interesting. While you can't have a democratic demise without a domestic 
story, the international component has been largely ignored. By implication, the 
literature would have us believe the domestic story is the only story. These clusters of 
democratic failure by their very presence imply an international component, and yet this 
has received little attention. 
15
 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978). 
16
 For examples of the case study approach see: Robert Fatton Jr. "The Impairments of Democratization: 
Haiti in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1999): 209-229; Paul 
Zaforski, "Democratic Breakdown in Paraguay and Venezuela: The Shape of Things to come for Latin 
America?" Armed Forces & Society 30, no. 1 (Fall 2003): 87-116; Vedi Hadiz, "Reorganizing Political 
Power in Indonesia: a Reconsideration of so-called Democratic Transitions," The Pacific Review 16, no. 4 
(December 2003): 591-611. 
17
 See, for example, Michael Bratton's "The 'Alternation Effect' in Africa," Journal of Democracy 15, no. 
4 (October 2004): 147-158; Pat McGowan and Thomas H. Johnson, "African Military Coups-d'Etat and 
7 
In looking again to Huntington, we find he has dedicated a scant few pages to the 
idea of the counterwaves, or democratic reversals that occur in clusters. He notes that 
after each advance of democracy, there is a retraction of democracy. And yet, by 
implication if there are international components to democracy's advance, there seem 
also to be international components to democracy's retreat. 
Other scholars mention the counterwave phenomenon in a peripheral way. Larry 
Diamond published an article entitled "Is Pakistan the (reverse) wave of the future?"19 In 
it, he fretted that Pakistan's failure would kick off a grand counterwave, given its high 
population, its status as a nuclear power, and its residence in a sensitive region. His 
concern was also elevated by his prediction that the Pakistani government was unlikely to 
recover democracy in the near future. And yet, in a subsequent article he largely laid 
these concerns to rest, concluding that no antidemocratic ideology had emerged to 
challenge democracy's normative hold. 
Michael McFaul also flirted with the idea of a counterwave in his article "The 4l 
• 91 
wave of democracy and dictatorship." He studied the transitions of post-communist 
states and tracked their progress away from communism. He noted that in countries with 
nearly equivalent power distributions between democrats and autocrats, protracted 
confrontation, not democratization, resulted. 
Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis," Journal of Modern African Studies 22, no. 4 
(December 1984): 633-666. 
18
 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, 
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 13-21. 
19
 Larry Diamond, "Is Pakistan the (Reverse) Wave of the Future?" Journal of Democracy 11, no. 3 (July 
2000): 91-106. 
20
 Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" Journal of Democracy 7, no. 3 (July 1996): 20-37. 
21
 Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the 
Postcommunist World," World Politics 54, no. 2 (January 2002): 212-244. 
8 
While Huntington, Diamond and McFaul all acknowledge the idea of the 
counterwave, Renske Doorenspleet challenges the very existence of waves of 
99 
democratization. This article critiques Huntingon's methodology in terms of his case 
selection criteria. She asserts that Huntington focuses on some aspects of democracy, 
such as competition, to the exclusion of other aspects of democracy, such as inclusion. 
She critiques Huntington's demonstration of democratic momentum by arguing for a 
methodology that includes the percentage of world states that are democracies. This is 
central, she asserts, since the total number of states in the system hasn't remained 
constant. If one takes these factors into account it leads to different outcomes, including 
a diminished appearance of reverse waves. In other words, Doorenspleet argues that we 
should raise the bar for defining democracy. In so doing, both waves and reverse waves 
are less distinct. My approach, as discussed more fully in the section describing the 
undergirding assumptions of this project, challenges Doorenspleet's notion that setting a 
high bar for democracy is the best way to study its progression and regression. 
Drawing on Related Literature 
The gap in the literature surrounding democratic decline and failure and the gap in 
the literature surrounding the counterwave are now evident. The related literature on 
democratic transition and democratic consolidation feature fewer holes. An increasing 
concern over the stalling of democratic reforms is particularly evident in the literature. 
22
 Renske Doorenspleet, "Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization," World Politics 52, no. 3 
(April 2000): 384-406. 
9 
While this literature doesn't alleviate the gap this work is addressing, it does provide a 
related literature upon which to draw. As such, it deserves some discussion here. 
Illiberal democracy and hybrid regimes 
In a critical article, Thomas Carothers calls into question the legitimacy of the 
democratic transition literature's assumptions. He points out the overly optimistic 
nature of much of the democratic transition and consolidation literature, accusing 
advocates of democratization of being somewhat naive in their assessments. He finds 
particular lack of support for the assumption that stalled democratization is an inherently 
unstable position. He also challenges the assertion there are distinct stages to 
democratization. 
This concern is echoed in a growing literature concerned with illiberal 
democracies and democracies, or those nations that seem to demonstrate Carothers' point 
by stabilizing in their stalled semi-democratic state. In fact, there has been increasing 
concern over the faltering democratization process in many countries. While the initial 
assumption of many scholars of democratization was the expectation of a few bumps 
along the pathway to democratic consolidation, reality is now forcing a different 
perspective. Many regimes seem content with what Larry Diamond has called "hybrid 
regime" status.24 While elections may be taking place at some level, these states do not 
exhibit any motivation to continue on the path to full-fledged liberal democracy.25 This 
23
 Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (January 
2002): 5-21. 
24
 Larry Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 21-
35. 
25
 Curtis Ryan and Jillian Schwedler, "Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime? The 2003 
Elections in Jordon," Middle East Policy 11, no. 2 (June 2004): 138-151; Guillermo O'Donnell 
"Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (January 1994): 55-69; Jason Brownlee, "Low 
Tide after the Third Wave: Exploring Politics under Authoritarianism," Comparative Politics 34, no. 4 
(July 2002): 477-498. 
10 
literature demonstrates the dawning realization that democratization has not proceeded in 
the linear fashion envisioned by early democratic theorists.26 In fact, illiberal democracy, 
usually as a result of democratic reversal, is a prevalent concern. Concern is rising that 
illiberal democracy may not be the inherently unstable entity it was once assumed to be, 
but instead may rest quite comfortably in a political zone that straddles democracy and 
autocracy. In spite of these broadly voiced concerns, no one has yet attempted a 
systematic evaluation of the spread of anti-democratic norms. 
Democratic consolidation 
By default, the democratic consolidation literature is related to democratic 
decline. If a particular variable is needed in order for democratic consolidation to 
happen, one can infer the absence of this would predicate democratic failure. And yet, 
the distinctions between democratic failure and democratic consolidation are real as 
noted by Linz and Stepan in their influential book on the problems of democratic 
consolidation. 
The democratic consolidation literature has several dominant theories. Of these, 
the economic development strain is probably the most prominent. The main argument is 
that a GDP of around $5,000 seems to guarantee democratic stability and insulate against 
W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1960). 
27
 Witness the success of Fareed Zakaria's popular treatise on illiberal democracy The Future of Freedom: 
Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003). 
28
 Vedi Hadiz, "The Rise of Neo-Third Worldism? The Indonesian Trajectory and the Consolidation of 
Illiberal Democracy," Third World Quarterly 25, no. 1 (February 2004): 55-71; William Case, "Malaysia's 
Resilient Psuedodemocracy," Journal of Democracy 12, no. 1 (January 2001): 43-57; Hussin Mutalib, 
"Illiberal Democracy and the Future of Opposition in Singapore," Third World Quarterly 21, no. 2 (April 
2000): 313-342. 
29
 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, 
South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 6. 
11 
o n 
reversal. Barbara Geddes, in her assessment of democratization, asserted that only the 
economic theory of democratic transition had garnered strong evidence.31 
Another economically derived democratic transition theory links likelihood to 
transition with resource endowment. These theorists argue that high resource 
endowment, especially with oil and diamonds, tend to impact a society's receptivity to 
democracy by creating anti-democratic incentives on the part of the elite.32 
Institutions play a prominent role in another strand of the democratic 
consolidation literature.33 Some scholars emphasize the type of political institution as 
being important in democratic consolidation.34 Others emphasize the stability and 
enforcement aspects of institutions, such as rule of law and the independence of the 
judiciary.35 Still others emphasize the importance of civilian control of the military.36 
Societal factors have also been considered. Some have investigated the claim that 
certain cultures are simply unreceptive to democracy.37 Others argue that ethnic divisions 
Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the 
World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
31
 Barbara Geddes, "What do we Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?" Annual Review of 
Political Science 2 (June 1999): 115-144. 
32
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3 (April 1999): 295-315. 
33
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Change," Comparative Politics 32, no. 1 (October 1999): 103-122. 
34
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35
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Science Review 91, no. 2 (June 1997): 245-63. 
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 See, as one example, Zoltan Barany's article "Democratic Consolidation and the Military: the East 
European experience," Comparative Politics 30, no. 1 (October 1997): 21-43. 
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certainly impact a society's ability to absorb democracy, as ethnic fragmentation leads to 
problems with conflict resolution.38 Still other scholars have noted the importance of 
shared values in the process of furthering political democratization. 
There is even a smattering of articles that consider international factors. Some 
argue that foreign aid is detrimental to democracy. Colaresi and Thompson argue that a 
number of international factors, such as external threat and trade openness, can aid or 
hinder democratization.41 In addition, Mark Peceny found that American sponsorship of 
elections during military interventions aided democratization, so a lack of external 
involvement could also be inferred to be detrimental to developing democracies.42 Other 
scholars have demonstrated the influence of outside information on the course of political 
change. This study lays the groundwork for examining the explanatory power and 
limits of these various theoretical strands within the democratic consolidation literature. 
The macro nature of this study will enable subsequent consideration of these competing 
explanatory theories. 
249; Clark Gibson, "Of Waves and Ripples: Democracy and Political Change in Africa in the 1990s," 
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Causal mechanisms of democratic failure 
As has already been stated, some of the literature that has already been examined 
infers a cause of democratic failure. For example, when Adam Przeworski and company 
demonstrate the impact of GDP on democracy's sustainability, the inference is that 
poverty causes of democratic failure.44 Many authors focus so exclusively on factors 
leading to consolidated democracy that one must draw inferences regarding democratic 
failure. There is also a considerable literature on the causes of democratic failure as 
studied in their own right. As with the other literature examined, there tend to be 
constellations. Myriad break-off theories of democratic failure exist, but this discussion 
will be confined to the main constituents. 
One constellation orbits around the role of political parties. A recent study has 
found that the initial level of competition between political parties in new democracies is 
crucial to its future. Low levels of initial political competitions are associated with 
democratic failure.45 Others have focused on the level of competition between the 
parties, locating an optimal level of competition with continued democratic governance, 
while democratic failure is associated with very high and very low levels of political 
competition.46 As evidenced by further studies, these scholars argue that political parties 
are central to determining whether a democracy will fail or not.47 
Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Weil-Being in the 
World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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A related constellation turns on the role of elites, a different category only 
because elites may or may not be members of political parties. The extent to which elites 
find it in their interest to either support or undermine democracy impacts its continuance 
or demise.48 The attitudes of the elites greatly impact the stability of democracy. 
The social fabric, particularly in regards to either homogeneity or heterogeneity, 
has also been linked to democratic failure. It may seem so obvious that it's not worth 
mentioning, but new democracies that are at war are predisposed to fail.49 A society's 
presence as a British colony, particularly as a long-term British colony, is linked with 
democratic survival.50 A more traditional social fabric argument is that democracy is not 
sustainable in heterogeneous societies.51 Even the early democratic theorist John Stuart 
Mill, thought democracy could not exist in heterogeneous societies.52 
Economic concerns form another main constellation of literature. As has already 
been discussed, poverty has been associated with democratic failure.53 Subsequent 
studies have developed this idea in more nuanced directions. Some find the greatest 
danger to democracy in states that combine a "basic needs" shortfall among the general 
John Higley and Michael Burton, "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns," 
American Sociological Review 54, no. 1 (February 1989): 17-32. 
49
 Joseph Wright, "Political Competition and Democratic Stability in New Democracies," British Journal of 
Political Science 38 (April 2008): 221-245. 
50
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population with increased economic development. Others have linked a non-
diversified, resource endowed state with democratic failure.55 
There is also a strand of literature looking at systemic concerns as they impact 
democratic failure. Some of these emphasize the role of conflict in the international 
system, others look at exogenous structural considerations, while others have focused 
on the structure of the bureaucracy.58 
It should be noted at the outset that while the cause of democratic failure is an 
important subject, it will not be the focus of this work. Instead, this work will focus on 
describing the incidence of democratic failure across time. Ultimately, the task of 
applying the findings of this study to future analyses of the underlying causes of 
democratic failure is left to others. 
Democratic diffusion 
The study of democratic failure also has much to gain from the literature 
surrounding the study of democratic diffusion. The counterwaves, in particular, might be 
conceived of as a sort of democratic diffusion in reverse. Simmons and Elkins have 
presented seminal studies on the topic.59 While acceptance of the idea of democratic 
Christopher Reenock, Michael Bernhard and David Sobek, "Regressive Socioeconomic Distribution and 
Democratic Survival," International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 3 (September 2007): 677-699. 
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diffusion is hardly universal, the literature surrounding the idea is broad enough to have 
made several contributions to democratization theory.61 One might reasonably ask if 
anti-democratization trends share links and similarities to democratic diffusion trends. 
Undergirding Assumptions 
Key concepts are fleshed out in this section, along with a brief description of the 
methods used. In more common parlance these might be called the underlying 
assumptions. Since the notion of underlying assumptions implies subliminal or 
surreptitiously derived meanings, I treat these as undergirding assumptions, since they 
form the structure upon which this project is built. 
The first assumption is that democracy can be defined. Can democracy be 
defined? Off the cuff, the answer is in the affirmative. Some states are democratic and 
others are not. Regular election cycles, the peaceful transfer of power, and competitive 
elections undergird the definition of democracy. To take it a step further, there are 
distinctives of "liberal" democracy, such as an independent judiciary, a certain set of 
guaranteed human rights for all citizens that cannot be voted away by the majority, lack 
of military involvement in the political process, etc. Tomes have been filled with various 
definitional considerations for democracy. In the years since the felling of the World 
For examples of diffusion dissenters, see Vincent Boudreau's "Diffusing Democracy? People Power in 
Indonesia and the Philippines," Critical Asian Studies 31, no. 4 (October 1999): 3-19; James Bill and Lynn 
Staeheli, "Discourses of Diffusion and Democratization," Political Geography 20 (2001): 175-195. 
61
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Trade Center, scholars and policy makers have struggled to define terrorism. As of this 
writing, their efforts have failed to form an international consensus. When one looks at 
the volumes filled with efforts to define democracy, the temptation is great to assume a 
lack of agreement in definition here as well. This work will not attempt to add to this 
philosophical debate, as worthy as that endeavor might be. Defining democracy is 
certainly not as easy a task as it first might seem, but through solid scholarship core 
accepted definitions have emerged.63 I do assert democracy is definable, even though 
common parlance applies imprecise nuances to the word. 
The second assumption is that democracy can be measured in ways that are 
meaningful, if not complete. If scholars have long debated the definition of democracy, 
the idea of somehow quantifying and measuring democracy has come in for even more 
debate. As Seymour Lipset and Jason Lakin have said "key parts of democracy lie 
outside the bounds of quantification."64 How does one measure and quantify a culture's 
commitment to democracy? I well remember in the days following the tragedy of 
September 11th, the terrorist assaults on the United States, being in a graduate seminar 
with several international students. One of my colleagues had grown up in Ukraine, 
largely under the Soviet Union's control. He immediately suggested that the United 
States close down the borders and enforce curfews. He couldn't understand why his 
American born colleagues looked at him with incredulity. 
This example is purely anecdotal, but it illustrates some of the elusive 
characteristics of democracy. These types of differences between cultures are difficult to 
63
 See, for example, Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Introduction: What Makes for 
a Democracy?" in Politics in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 1-66. 
64
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2004), 12. 
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quantify, although few would dispute their existence. While democracy's success in Asia 
significantly undermines the cultural argument, neither can we entirely ignore 
Tocqueville's "habits of the heart" argument, which infers that commitment to 
democracy must be cultivated in a culture's ideals. Instead, I readily acknowledge that 
all aspects of democracy can not be entirely quantified. 
And yet, as a former skeptic of all quantitative approaches, I must admit the utility 
of the more easily quantifiable aspects of democracy. Key to measuring democracy is the 
ability to observe certain measurable components. Can one ascertain whether elections 
are taking place? Yes. In spite of the fairly recent propensity of even grossly autocratic 
rulers to use elections as a means for continuance of rule, one can observe and record 
elections. One can determine the presence of regular elections and there are many 
signposts to indicate whether they are open and competitive. One can look at the 
constitutions and institutions that govern the actions of nations. One can point to whether 
or not these documents and institutions actually are taken into account when decisions are 
made or simply remain lofty ideals held apart from the gritty realities of political vice. 
Coups are observable phenomena, as is military interference in the political process. One 
can observe the repression of human rights and the lack of freedom of the press as well as 
the reaction of the government to the opposition. One can observe whether the 
opposition is jailed and persecuted or permitted to air their views. 
These tangibles may not be sufficient in and of themselves for sustaining 
democracy over time. However, these measurable components of democracy are crucial 
in inculcating the habits of the heart. In fact, it is evident that these habits of the heart 
and the cultural supporting mechanisms that give democratic rule sustenance are 
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impossible without these initial measurable mechanisms. For the purposes of this study it 
is enough to acknowledge the crucial interplay between the measurable and 
unquantifiable components of democracy in its maintenance over time. This study will 
focus on the nuts and bolts of democracy, knowing that these measurable components, 
while not sufficient, are entirely necessary. 
Fortunately, several databases now exist for measuring democracy.65 The 
Freedom House index and the Polity IV database are the most widely used of these, with 
the Polity IV exceeding Freedom House in scope of time. In addition the Polity IV 
database has benefited from testing and improvements in transparency and through 
systematic study of the database's weaknesses.66 Because of its longer duration, the 
Polity database has served as the underlying measure of democracy and autocracy for this 
study. The Polity database looks at institutionalized authority characteristics. Since I 
view institutions as a reflection of the values held by a society, or at least by those in 
power in a society, this helps bridge the gap between inherently measurable aspects of 
democracy and the "habits of the heart" discussed earlier. 
The third assumption is that both scaled and dichotomous measures of democracy 
are useful. For the most part, I treat democracy as a scaled measure, as something that 
can be present in increasing and decreasing concentrations. Why take a scaled approach? 
Doesn't this run the risk of diluting democracy until it means nothing at all? It seems that 
Juan Linz has this in mind when he exhorts: 
65
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New adjectival democracies are labeled "pseudo", "semi", "illiberal," 
"electoral", or "delegative"—but these terms are in fact being used to 
describe nondemocratic regimes (or in a few cases, low-quality democratic 
governments).. .To avoid confusion, I propose the addition of adjectives to 
"authoritarianism" rather than to "democracy": for example, electoral 
authoritarianism, multiparty authoritarianism, center authoritarianism with 
subnational democracy.67 
While Linz is absolutely correct in the dangers of viewing democracy on a scale, 
his approach fails to adequately take in the changes that have taken place within the 
system. It is difficult to highlight these changes, which have been profound even when 
the progression to coherent democracy has not been utter and complete, without referring 
to these nation states using a scaled description of democracy. This project looks at 
trends so it is particularly useful to categorize democracy as a scaled variable. Doing so 
gives us leverage in comparing and contrasting and allows us to track changes in the 
levels of democracy across time. 
As has already been discussed, much study has gone into the measurement criteria 
for democracy. The debate over measuring democracy as a dichotomous or scaled 
variable has also benefited from scholarly discourse. In their article "Democracy and 
Dichotomies: A Pragmatic Approach to Choices about Concepts," Collier and Adcock 
argue that the use of democracy as a dichotomous variable or graded variable depends on 
/TO 
the goals of the research. Elkins argues that on the whole graded measures have 
superior validity and reliability.6 For the purposes of this study, a scaled approach is 
used, except when issuing broad level comparisons between democracy and autocracy. 
Juan Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2000), 34. 
68
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The Polity IV database gives each nation state in the international system with a 
population of one million or greater, a polity score for each year. This score is based on a 
scale ranging from -10 to 10, with -10 being the most autocratic and 10 the most 
democratic. This study divides democracy into 3 subgroups, based on their polity score. 
On one end, we have high level democracy, with scores of 8 to 10. Next is mid-level 
democracy, with scores of 5 to 7. The final category is low level democracy, with scores 
of 1 to 4. Democracy is clearly present in the high level subset, which includes most 
Western nations and an increasing number of non-Western nations as well. The mid-
level democracy category includes those nations typically described in the literature as 
consolidating. Low level democracies are sometimes not referred to as democracies at 
all, but are often described as weak autocracies or liberalizing regimes. Democratic 
failure is defined as a 3 point drop in polity score, which Polity has created as their 
threshold for regime change.70 
The fourth assumption is that a macro-level systematic analysis of democratic 
failure is of value. Having dealt with the main definitional considerations, I will now 
discuss the systematic nature of this study. Is this really the best approach? Would it not 
instead be better to jump on the bandwagon of the burgeoning democratic consolidation 
literature and attempt to problem solve using individual case studies? What is learned 
from this method that can't be learned from case studies? Are there benefits to a "large 
N" study or do the generalities that derive from such a study only mask the fact that all 
cases of democratic regression are so individualized that studying them corporately is 
futile? 
70
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22 
The fact that democracy's regression is clustered in certain time periods suggests 
there may be systemic factors at work, exacerbating the domestic picture. While it is 
beyond the scope of this work to definitively pinpoint all the systemic factors that 
contribute to democratic failure, an in-depth description of the actual phenomenon should 
serve to elucidate certain characteristics of the trend. This I shall do in Chapter III. 
It is worthwhile to note that only through systematic study was the international 
component of the forward progression of democracy described. As previously noted in 
Samuel Huntington's Third Wave, the phenomenon of democracy's forward march across 
time was broadly characterized to the general benefit of the field. In fact, this book 
sparked an outpouring of literature on the progression of democracy. The big picture 
characterization of democracy's forward waves allowed other questions to be asked, and 
other hypotheses to be tested. 
The fact that this service has not yet been performed for the counterwave 
phenomenon is somewhat puzzling, but may be due to a preoccupation with democracy's 
advance. While scholars have recognized the challenges faced by transitions to 
democracy, as evidenced by the large extant literature on democratic transitions and 
consolidation, the field has given little attention to the potential links in democratic 
regression 
This study, therefore, will largely approach things at the macro level, 
supplementing with specific examples only in an illustrative manner. The compatibility 
of the 2 approaches is fleshed out in Michael Coppedge's article "Thickening thin 
concepts and theories—Combining large N and small in comparative politics."71 The 
71Michael Coppedge, "Thickening Thin Concepts and Theories: Combining Large N and Small in 
Comparative Politics," Comparative Politics 32, no. 4 (July 1999): 465-476. 
23 
author argues that small n studies benefit from the testing of large N studies, while 
quantitative studies gain richness and depth from the case study approach. 
Like an epidemiologist, this work will look at the epidemics, hitherto little 
described, that strike democracies. The causes of democratic decline vary by location 
and circumstance. Some democracies are aborted, some only wounded, some diseased 
and others stunted. Their recovery is similarly distinct. Some democracies, like cats, 
seem to have 9 lives. Others use their experience with decline as a sort of vaccination 
experience, contracting a mild form of an illness while building immunity. This study 
does not mean to imply that the individual patients are unimportant. It merely suggests 
that challenges to democracy—whether experienced as complete failure, stagnation or 
decline—are largely clustered together in time. Just as democracy goes forward in 
waves, it retreats in waves as well. 
Just as the study of epidemics in no way obviates the need for individual 
physicians, this work doesn't obviate the need for case study analysis. Indeed, it draws 
upon case study analysis. However, it does take a macro level approach that allows a big 
picture view that facilitates a broader understanding of the threats to democracy. This is 
an apt argument for macro studies. 
This study attempts to untangle the big picture. Some might argue that there is no 
big picture, but I disagree. The big picture is and has always been there, but in this age of 
increasing globalization and information overload with increasing means of 
communicating, the big picture is increasingly important. In order to put together 
patterns, make sense of trends and prepare and equip nations for life in the international 
system, the big picture is more important than ever. 
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The fifth assumption is that history teaches important lessons. If the world is a 
completely unpredictable place, wholly separated from historical context, if the past has 
no bearing on the present, if we are doomed to always repeat the same policy mistakes 
over and over again then there is no reason for scholarly debate. In the realm of 
international study, academic endeavors are "graspings after the wind" in a world where 
history doesn't matter. I argue this is not the case. History is important. At times history 
demonstrates the ways we have changed, at other times the ways we have remained the 
same. Regardless, it is impossible to fully understand the present without an 
understanding of the past. 
Conclusion 
Understanding democratic regression is crucial to safeguarding democracy. 
While the literature on democratization is burgeoning, few scholars are devoted to 
studying the threats to democracy. Perhaps this is hardly surprising given the optimism 
surrounding the spread of democracy. In the euphoria surrounding the end of the Cold 
War, democracy's triumph took on the air of inevitability. Democracy had survived and 
as the last man standing, seemed to point to itself as the ultimate political endpoint. 
Francis Fukuyama's oft-quoted article trumpeted and celebrated this triumph of liberal 
democracy as the end of history.72 In a more recent book, however, Fukuyama rushes to 
qualify his thesis by arguing the triumph of liberal democracy was never automatic, and 
is in need of safeguards to assure its continued progression. As some hard-won 
72
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democratic gains seem increasingly tenuous, the time is ripe for a comprehensive 
evaluation of democratic failure and the examination of that failure as it has functioned in 
the international system. The time is right to provide a safeguard to democracy by filling 
the gap in the literature with a comprehensive treatment of democratic failure in the 
context of counterwaves. Fortunately, the existing literature has laid both the theoretical 
and methodological groundwork that make this project possible. 
This study also offers a venue to add to our understanding of the antidemocratic 
movements which had such great historical impact. While fascism and communism, 
along with the impacts of colonialism, have been discussed in great depth, they have yet 
to be discussed in great width. This study offers just such an opportunity to investigate 
the width of the historical incidence of anti-democratic political change. 
Looking at democracy as a scaled variable offers important comparative 
perspectives across the spectrum. I will examine highly organized forms of autocracy 
and democracy, as well as looking at political systems with mixed autocratic and 
democratic characteristics. Doing so gives us a better idea of the function of the 
democratic ideal. It also offers points of comparison for nation states that swing back and 
forth between democracy and autocracy. Through it all, I look at the way the 
international system has evolved over time. In particular, I observe the ways it is both 
different and the same since the adoption of democracy as the driving force behind ideal 
and legitimate governance. 
How will all of these things be accomplished? Before embarking on the meat of 
the project, I will take a chapter to examine the oft-neglected foundations of democracy 
and anti-democracy. I will look at this from the standpoint of political philosophy and 
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historical chronology. With this knowledge firmly in hand, I'll examine the 
counterwaves, the clusters of democratic failure. From there, I'll embark on an 
examination of polities in order of decreasing democratic characteristics. I will first 
consider high level democratic failure before turning to dissonant democracies, those 
nation states with lower levels of democratic governance that have decidedly mixed 
authority traits but still have discernible democratic characteristics. Finally, I'll look at 
autocratic states, in particular at those states that have experienced the deepening of 
autocracy. I'll then end the study where it began, with a discussion of the implications of 
the findings, with a particular focus on tying together the remnants of antidemocratic 
thought and its impact in the modern international system. 
27 
CHAPTER II 
FOUNDATIONS FOR ANTIDEMOCRACY 
For philosophers and theologians alike, the problem of explaining the existence of 
evil has been somewhat intractable. Is evil a force of its own, or is it simply the absence 
of good? Is it defined as an independent entity, or only in relation to its twisting and 
perversion of good? These questions of good and evil may, at first glance, seem to have 
little place in a discourse about democratic failure, but I believe they inform our 
discussion in important ways. The point is not to assert that democracy is good and 
democratic failure is evil, but rather that democratic failure in and of itself is defined as a 
lack of democracy. The reversion to some other form of governance is couched in terms 
reserved for democracy. 
Even speech patterns revolve around democracy in order to describe democratic 
failure. In fact, Charles Tilly, in his book Democracy, could only refer to democratic 
failure using terms like "undemocracy" and "de-democratization."' This is not simply a 
matter for philologists, but gives important insight into how democratic failure is viewed 
as a concept. It suggests that the various forms of autocracy are no more than the absence 
of democracy. 
I suggest that antidemocracy is a more apt term to describe the undercurrents in 
democratic failure. I contend there are, and certainly always have been, forces aligned 
against democracy, that by the same token form an ideational alternative to democracy. 
This chapter traces these ideas through history, examines the main themes in 
1
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antidemocracy in greater detail, then closes with an examination of the iterations of 
antidemocratic ideals that continue to resonate today. 
Antidemocracy through History 
To frame the discussion of antidemocratic ideas, one must first look at the 
possible constellations of power. Where does power reside? There are 3 basic 
possibilities and myriad idiosyncratic manifestations. One person can be in charge, the 
rule of one. A group of elite can be in charge, rule of the few. Or everyone that meets 
certain requirements has a say in governance, rule of the many. All governments, historic 
and present, can be loosely described as fitting into one of these 3 broad categories. The 
purpose of this portion of the chapter is to journey back through history to examine the 
ways each of these 3 different forms has been advocated at different points in history, 
determining how democracy became the most venerated form of governance today. This 
recap identifies undercurrents that are still present and highly relevant to the discussion 
when government by "the many" lapses back into rule by one or the few. 
The East 
The East has never been accused of being naturally fertile ground for democracy. 
This is not to say hints of democracy have been completely absent in the East, but 
without doubt democracy first took root in the West. This becomes less surprising if one 
examines some of the main constellations of thought prevalent in the East and their 
predispositions toward democracy. 
Indian philosophy winds back into pre-recorded history. The dominant religious 
and cultural traditions of Hinduism and Buddhism both found their genesis in India. 
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While these religious traditions are complex and distinct, they do share some similarities 
that are important to this discussion. Both emphasize the importance of the self, which at 
first glance might seem fertile ground for democracy since rule by the many presupposes 
the importance of the individual. But, the focus turns to inward self improvement. 
Above all else, Indian philosophy desires the liberation of self from fragmented 
existence, through self-discipline and self-knowledge.2 Indian philosophy rests upon 2 
further fundamental assumptions. It presupposes universal moral justice. The world 
metes out to us only what we deserve. We bear the responsibility, and have determined 
our own past and future. The other assumption is the unity of self and universe. Because 
of this unity, the undivided whole, each individual has the ability to find this wholeness 
through self-knowledge. Because self-knowledge is central, truth is relative. 
It is impossible for one person to subscribe to one "true" philosophy and 
to regard the others as completely false. Truth in philosophy depends 
upon the human subject, and another's experience can be known only as 
an object. There is no knowing the other as subject. Consequently, there 
is no rejecting the other's experience as inadequate or unsatisfactory.3 
The Indian philosophic concentration on self-discovery, its commitment to 
relative truth, and its presupposition of universal moral justice did not give rise to a 
robust tradition of political philosophy. The presupposition of universal moral justice, in 
particular, reinforced societal suffering as deserved, while also reinforcing the notion that 
the requisite tools for escaping that suffering were already available to each person within 
himself. Given these philosophical presuppositions, it is not surprising democracy was 
birthed outside India's borders. And yet, democracy has managed to survive there in 
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modern times, in spite of the cultural foundation that would seem to oppose it, urging 
caution to those who would argue democracy can only be sustained where it was birthed. 
Much blame for Asian distaste for democracy has also been laid at the feet of 
Confucius, born around 551 B.C. Unlike his Indian counterparts, Confucian philosophy 
was essentially political in nature. Living in a tumultuous time, he founded a political 
philosophy that permeated every aspect of social relationships. Centralized leadership, in 
the form of an emperor, was crucial to his idealized society, as were correct social 
boundaries and loyalties. The ruler was to be emulated as he modeled correct adherence 
to virtue, while social relationships were governed by the key virtues of filial piety, 
loyalty, and manners.4 While much wisdom can be garnered from The Analects, 
democracy, with its focus on individual rights, is not one of them. Still, at various points 
of time in imperial China, the governing system which rested on Confucian ideals 
supported a meritocracy in which the best and brightest experienced significant social 
mobility while providing a system of some restraint against highly centralized imperial 
rule. 
The West 
We've established some antidemocratic leanings in the main thoughts of Eastern 
philosophy, now we turn to Western philosophy to see if the case is any different. 
Interestingly, echoes of Confucian philosophy can be found in the writings of Plato. 
Written around 360 B.C., Plato's Republic puts forth the rule of a philosopher king, 
supported by an elite class of educated philosophers, who would rule by example, 
training and educating the masses in the ways of virtue. His idealized society 
4
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emphasized education as a key to advancing the mind and taming the spirit.5 The king 
would be the idealized form of all these important attributes. Plato never even hints that 
democracy is an acceptable form of government. Like Confucius, his ideal governance 
centers on a good ruler as the key to a stable Utopian society. 
Thucydides, a contemporary of Plato, offers a slightly different perspective on the 
value of democracy. Athens, often cited as a democracy, elected their generals and city 
treasurers, showing the tangible difference between the East and the West in terms of the 
practice of democracy.6 Defying predictions to the contrary, the Athenian democracy 
lasted for 150 years, with only a couple brief interludes of oligarchic rule. While 
Thucydides wasn't glowing in his review of democratic rule, he includes Athenogoras' 
defense of democracy, in response to the charge that democracy was neither wise nor 
equitable: 
I say, on the contrary, first that the word demos, or people, includes the 
whole state, oligarchy only a part; next that if the best guardians of 
property are the rich, and the best counselors the wise, none can hear and 
decide so well as the many; and that all these talents individually and 
collectively, have their just place in a democracy. But an oligarchy gives 
the many their share of the danger, and not content with the largest part 
takes and keeps the whole of the profit.7 
Thus, even in a form of democracy that today would be treated as quite limited, 
democracy was viewed by some as the most equitable form of governance. In fact, it is 
reasonable to assert that the brevity of the 2 oligarchic disruptions in democratic rule 
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indicates the democratic form of governance was important to the general public, 
otherwise it would not have been reinstated and defended. 
Aristotle, in his Politics, made the contribution of advocating a mixed form of 
governance. While Aristotle, like Plato, emphasized the virtues of the rulers, he stressed 
the constitution as the key to limiting the power of rulers.8 He saw the importance of 
creating a convergence of norms and ideas of governance. If everyone buys into the 
constitution, a system of constraint is in place so that the type of governance is 
unimportant. This seemingly even-handed approach to regime type belies Aristotle's 
underlying prejudice against democracies. He notes that "while it is possible for one or a 
few to be outstandingly virtuous, it is difficult for a larger number to be accomplished in 
every virtue."9 Perhaps more in accord with his teacher Plato than he would like to 
admit, throughout the book he hints at the relative practical ease of kingship and the 
relative difficulties inherent in mass representation. At best, he gives the "rule by the 
many" a place alongside other legitimate forms of government as long as it doesn't 
descend into a deviant form. While he advocates working toward the common good, he 
indicates the achievement of this ideal will more likely occur in rule by the one or the 
few. 
From the ancient Greece we leapfrog through history to reach Machiavelli in a 
fragmented Italy that still resembles the city state mentality of the Greek period we've 
just been discussing. In his well-known essay The Prince, again the admiration for strong 
a centralized authority figure emerges. While his essays in The Discourses offer a defense 
of democracy that contrasts to his better known piece, Machiavelli's practical advice to 
8
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the ruler of his day in The Prince at least demonstrates the continuing reliance on 
centralized rule by the one or the few as the most practical political arrangement, while 
the arguments of The Discourses demonstrate some of democracy's desirable 
components. 
From Machiavelli, we fast forward again through the dominance of monarchy and 
city states to a time in Western history when legislatures were finally in ascendance and 
change was in the air. In this grouping, the works of some of the Enlightenment political 
philosophers will be considered. Particular attention will focus on the issue of ideal 
governance, in a time when shifts away from traditional monarchy marked a break from 
the past. 
Thomas Hobbes published Leviathan in 1651, raising his overarching concern for 
protection from anarchy. He emphasized the importance of stability and sacrificed 
freedom. But it is his role as an advocate of the absolute necessity of a centralized power 
that remains the distinguishing characteristic of his book.10 The central power's actions 
are unpunishable. He is both the maker and enforcer of laws, and the maker of both war 
and peace. n Hobbes blames the division of these sovereign rights (into powers for the 
King, powers for the Lords, and powers for the House of Commons) for the Civil War 
that was taking place in Britain at the time of the writing of his book. It is not 
surprising that the thoughts found here. The ultimate value placed on a stable society 
1 "3 
echoes the works of Roman writers who also wrote during times of civil war. The 
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premium placed on security, when security is absent, certainly has informed regime type 
choices, and remains relevant today, finding echoes in the "garrison state" literature 
mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Writing a rough 100 years after Hobbes, Rousseau published The Social Contract 
in 1762. His critique of monarchy, especially the argument that a monarchy was best 
suited to preserving stability at all costs, was quite direct...even cheeky: 
Life is also tranquil in dungeons; is that enough to feel well in them? The 
Greeks imprisoned in the Cyclops' cave lived there tranquilly while 
awaiting their turn to be devoured. 4 
Departing from guarantees of societal stability that were rooted in centralized authority, 
or in a virtuous king, Rousseau's main proposal took a modified community utilitarian 
approach. This approach answered the puzzle of finding "a form of association that will 
defend and protect the persona and goods of each associate with the full common 
force."15 This compact, which he dubbed the "social contract," solved the problem he 
saw with man's natural tendency to look only to his own self-preservation and the impact 
this had on society in general. In describing this philosophy Rousseau envisioned that 
"each of us puts his person and his full power in common under the supreme direction of 
the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the 
whole."16 
While concern for equality was central, enforcement of the contract hardly required 
the direction of the many. As the author himself acknowledged, it depended on a 
dictatorial community that did whatever it took to enforce the contract: 
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Hence, for the social compact not to be an empty formula, it tacitly 
includes the following engagement which alone can give force to the rest, 
that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so 
by the entire body; which means nothing other than that he shall be forced 
to be free....17 
So, we can see that Rousseau introduced this idea of a centralized authority that would 
enforce the will of the majority. This paternalism, while a step away from Hobbes more 
starkly conceived central authority, is by no means a friend to liberal democracy. 
Perhaps it is all the more dangerous for being insidious. 
Of course, there were other writers during this time period that made significant 
contributions to liberal democracy's advance. John Locke, added formulations of the rule 
1 R 
of law in his Treatise. Immanuel Kant for the first time linked regime type to propensity 
for conflict, suggesting an international system populated with republics would be key to 
peace.19 John Stuart Mill pointed out the dangers of Rousseau's Social Contract by 
delineating the tyranny of the majority. These works were important in countering the 
antidemocratic currents of the Enlightenment. 
In direct counterpoint to the ideal of democracy as the future of pure governance 
was the ideal of communism. Occupying scarcely more than forty pages of typewritten 
text, The Communist Manifesto makes up for in substance what it lacks in duration. The 
spark for a movement that changed the direction of history and impacted the lives of 
millions, this slender volume deserves careful consideration. 
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With its famous opening line to Chapter One, this essay promptly divides the 
world into 2 groups, the oppressor and the oppressed.21 The essay traced the impact of 
the Industrial Revolution, and the free trade movement as harbingers of a new class they 
called the industrial proletariat consisting of workers that were being exploited by the 
resource-rich bourgeoisie. Some elements of the modern anti-globalization movement 
find roots here as Marx and Engels lament the dependency that the spread of commerce 
has induced in foreign lands throughout the world.22 
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of 
production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws 
all, even the most barbarian nations into civilization. The cheap prices of 
its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all 
Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate 
hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of 
extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to 
introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become 
bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own 
23 
image. 
At its most basic level, the manifesto deals with the fundamentals of human 
purpose and existence, these being the struggles to live with technology, to find meaning 
in life, and to deal with change. 
Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labour, the 
work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, 
consequently, all charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage of 
the machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous, and most 
easily acquired knack, that is required of him. Hence, the cost of 
production of a workman is restricted, almost entirely, to the means of 
subsistence that he requires for his maintenance, and for the propagation 
of his race.24 
In the conditions of the proletariat, those of old society at large are already 
virtually swamped. The proletarian is without property; his relation to his 
wife and children has no longer anything in common with the bourgeois 
family relations; modern industrial labour, modern subjugation to capital, 
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the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped 
him of every trace of national character. Law, morality, religion, are to 
him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as 
many bourgeois interests.25 
The Communist movement searched for significance in the midst of a world that 
seemed threatening. It offered the hope of change for the better to those left behind in the 
shuffle of "progress." It resonated with the target audience of the disenfranchised, even 
when they didn't fit the label "modern industrial labor." The Communist movement 
remains an example of the power of an idea to motivate diverse unhappy people 
worldwide to participate in, or submit themselves to, revolution. At its peak it faced 
democracy with a grave threat, seizing upon the ideas of equality and a type of social 
contract for the betterment of the majority. The political systems that emerged promised 
basic levels of goods to all. In return, the central State took a great deal of authority and 
left little individual autonomy. Communism, in short, combined several of the ideals of 
Hobbes' leviathan state and coupled them with Rousseau's ideas of working for the good 
of the majority. It was the culmination of a fusion of ideals. 
The threads of this discussion hint at the inherent weaknesses long dead political 
pundits saw in democracy. Some of these can be explained away simply because the 
word democracy means something different in common usage today than it did in 
previous eras. Still, the idea that "the masses" would be involved in governance has 
brought up interesting, and sometimes enlightened, discussions on the frailties of 
democracy. In this treatment of democratic failure, the examination of these critiques is 
well-served. It addresses the fundamental concept of how much the international 
25
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community of today is different than that of the past, and the ways it is the same. From 
this topic we will now turn to recurring themes in antidemocracy. 
Themes in Antidemocracy 
This section will explore various themes in antidemocracy. These themes 
undermine the democratic ideal and form an important base for the discussion of 
democratic failure in the time period under consideration. 
Mass rule equals instability 
What does it mean to say "the people have spoken?" This phrase could rightly be 
uttered at the conclusion of a lynching or at the announcement of the winner of a well-
ordered election, although the circumstances surrounding the 2 differ dramatically. And 
yet, both cases reflect the will of the many. Mob rule is hardly considered an appropriate 
expression of democracy today, and yet mobs on violent binges consistently appear in 
historic criticisms of democracy. 
Even Cicero, often described as one of the most eloquent defenders of electoral 
contests,26 speaks of democracy as a type of mob rule with "cruel and violent potential" 
although with benefits if managed by a good leader.27 This mercurial aspect of mass rule 
has been decried across the centuries as an undesirable side effect of democratic rule. 
Given this, chronic instability should surface as a major failing of unrestricted mass rule. 
Cicero thus advocated a public united in a genuine "partnership founded on law," 
otherwise mass participation devolves into a "despotism exercised by the mob." 
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When this rule of law is absent, mob rule indeed becomes violent. This is true in 
the Roman Empire as well as in ancient Greece. What has been referred to as "direct 
democracy," where mass assemblies were in control, can only be described as volatile 
and violent. Polybius, a Greek statesman, described the strength of the Roman 
constitution as being mixed, in the best Aristotelian sense. Comprised of checks and 
balances, it was able to stave off the undesirable side effects of the simple forms of rule 
by one, rule by the few, and rule by the many. As John Dickenson notes: 
According to Polybius, each of these forms was represented, respectively, 
by the consuls, the senate, and the assemblies; but through the reciprocal 
checks and balances which existed among the organs representing the 
principles of these different forms of government, the mixed form, 
operating in mutual interdependency of all three, exhibited special strength 
by maintaining an appropriate equilibrium among them.29 
When the system of checks and balances degenerated, the atmosphere within the Roman 
Empire changed, reverting back to mob rule which in turn paved the way for 
"irresponsible demagoguery as a normal feature of political activity." Within the space 
of 40 years, Roman politics featured decreased senatorial influence and power, chronic 
"3 1 
election riots and prevalent bloodshed. 
While Aristotle was not fond of democracy in his writings, we can perhaps 
attribute a portion of this to the way democracy was conceived in his time. In ancient 
times the word was associated with the immediate action of the mob, who might then 
regret their decisions, while democracy today is associated with measured action. Today 
the whole judicial process in liberal democracies is associated with slowness, not 
immediate justice. Aristotle's advocacy of a mixed constitution contemplated the idea 
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for a system of checks and balances, which could temper the very dangers of instability 
he feared in the democracy of his time. 
Machiavelli echoes Aristotle's concerns, adding his voice to those fearing 
instability in democracy saying "Thus monarchies easily become tyrannies, aristocracies 
become oligarchies and democracies slide into anarchy."32 It is important to notice that 
although both tyranny and oligarchy are on Aristotle's list of bad outcomes for a nation, 
the dissolution of democracy plunges a city state into "ungovernment" while the other 
transformations from "good" rule to "bad" rule are still functional governments...even if 
considered evil. This peculiarity of democracy suggests a similarly peculiar logic. When 
the people no longer attend to the government, there is no alternative other than anarchy. 
With monarchy, when the government degenerates, it simply collapses in and shows its 
might. With aristocracies, they centralize and rule by force as well, but for a democracy 
the dissolution leaves no structure behind, since "we the people" have abandoned the 
structure of government and nothing remains with which to construct even an 
authoritarian government. After all, it is impossible for "we the people" to tyrannize 
themselves. Thus, instability reigns chief. While Aristotle's definition of democracy 
differed somewhat substantially from that of today, the critique of democracy as a 
destroyer of stability is still touted today as democracies are seen as particularly unstable 
and prone to disintegration. 
While recognizing these frequent critiques of democracy, De Tocqueville 
observed none of them in the newly made United States. As has already been noted, a 
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critique of democracy that consistently surfaces is the lack of stability for this particular 
type of governance, but de Tocqueville notes a change that has occurred with the leap of 
democracy from city state to nation state: 
I hear it said that it is in the nature and the habits of democracies to be 
constantly changing their opinions and feelings. This may be true of small 
democratic nations, like those of the ancient world, in which the whole 
community could be assembled in a public place and then excited at will 
by an orator. But I saw nothing of the kind among the great democratic 
people that dwells on the opposite shores of the Atlantic Ocean.34 
The democracy of nation states, almost invariably larger than the city states where direct 
democracy was more plausible, depended upon institutions. These institutions seemed to 
tame direct democracy's dark side, creating a system of checks and balances within rule 
by the many that represented a deviation from past forms of democracy. 
A utocracy 's lingering power 
Machiavelli described another aspect of the instability of new democracies as 
centered in the nature of the people long accustomed to an autocratic regime and their 
inability to adjust their faculties to democracy and greater freedom. 
There are numerous examples to be found in ancient history that show 
how difficult it is for a people who are accustomed to being ruled by one 
man to preserve their liberty if by some chance they acquire it, as Rome 
acquired its liberty when it threw out the Tarquins. This is as you would 
expect, for such a people are no different from a wild beast which, 
although by nature savage and untamed, has been raised from birth in a 
prison and in slavery. If it is then allowed to wander freely in the 
countryside, because it has no experience of hunting for its food and no 
knowledge of where to take refuge, it will be recaptured by the first person 
who sets out to hunt it down. The same thing happens with a people. 
Being used to living at the commande of others, having no experience of 
debating questions of strategy, whether of defense or offense, having no 
knowledge of their neighboring rulers, and being unknown to them, they 
quickly succumb once again to a ruler's yoke and usually end up under a 
harsher tyranny than the one from which they have just escaped....In 
addition, there is another problem, which is that a state that becomes free 
acquired bitter enemies, but not loyal allies. All those who benefited 
under the previous tyranny, who fed off the wealth of the ruler, become 
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bitter enemies. They have lost the opportunity to become rich, and so 
cannot live content. Each one of them is forced to try to reconstruct the 
old tyranny in order to recover his old influence.35 
Machiavelli deals with several themes that certainly still resonate today. He 
asserts that highly centralized rule, even once it has been defeated, leaves a residue 
staining the people whose minds have been sheltered from the necessities of daily rule. 
He accuses the people of ignorance, and the inability to break out of the shackles of their 
minds. In short, "the many" don't know the ropes and so they hang themselves. In 
addition, Machiavelli addresses the problem of the disenfranchised elite, who 
automatically become enemies of the new regime, an idea with resonance today.36 The 
failure to offer adequate options, even "buy outs," to former regime officials is still 
positively associated with democratic failure. 
Democracy is too Utopian 
"If there were a people of Gods, they would govern themselves democratically. 
So perfect a Government is not suited to men."37 With this statement, Rousseau 
condemns democracy as unfettered idealism. But was he really talking about democracy 
as known today, or was he using the word to mean something completely different? 
Clues are given by the context surrounding the statement. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's 
definition of democracy is a different animal than that as later conceived in the American, 
and even the French, Revolution. The "new" democracy involved certain intrinsic rights, 
something Rousseau rejected. Today, the democratic ideal includes guarantees of 
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individual freedoms, not unlike those guarantees involved in the Bill of Rights, and 
reacting against the "tyranny of the majority" mentality. Rousseau, in contrast, had 
called for a tyranny of the majority as the true reflection of the best way forward. This is 
another good example of the caution we need to show in assuming words have had the 
same meaning across time. The same words are oftentimes used, but with very different 
meanings and contexts. Caution is in order. 
In today's common parlance, democracy is not only a type of government, it is 
also a hypothetical ideal. Perfect participation, the perfect expression of all segments of 
the population eligible to participate in politics, occurs only in the realm of the ideal. 
Utopian democracy is indeed a dream, but democratic governance does exist. In this 
world of imperfect and flawed people, democracy fairly reflects the qualities of its 
constituents. Democracy is largely about the exercise of restraint. The beast may paw at 
the ground, but the people serve as both bridle and bit that direct the leviathan. 
And yet Rousseau dismissed democracy as an inherently unrealistic form of 
governance saying: 
In the strict sense of the term, a genuine Democracy never has existed, and 
never will exist. It is against the natural order that the greater number 
govern and the smaller number be governed. It is unimaginable that the 
people remain constantly assembled to attend to public affairs, and it is 
readily evident that it could not establish commissions to do so without the 
TO 
form of the administration changing. 
Clearly, Rousseau could not foresee any arrangement of democratic institutions that 
could convert democracy from Utopian ideal to tangible governance. The fact that these 
institutions did evolve freed democracy from these antidemocratic entanglements. In 
modern times, however, the criticism of democracy as too Utopian still surfaces, 
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particularly when speaking of countries that do not have well-developed institutions to 
both tame democracy and ensure forward progress beyond legislative gridlock. 
There are other weaker variants of the idea of democracy as Utopian. Even Alexis 
de Tocqueville thought democracy had only arisen in American because of the lack of 
external threats. He argues that democracy was able to flourish in America because it 
was "a nation without neighbors."40 He saw external threats as an impetus for the 
increase of the executive government, since foreign affairs remains the one arena where 
democracy cannot penetrate.41 One can infer from Tocqueville's argument that in the 
continental context of Europe, democracy would be harder to implement. This expands a 
bit on Machiavelli's discussion of a similar point, that when a power is brought down the 
alliance structure necessary for state survival is difficult to implement since all those in 
the system have a vested interest in the prior status quo.42 These arguments demonstrate 
the perceived difficulties of being a democracy in an international system that didn't 
respect that type of governance. 
The dangers of democracy's rhetoric 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was also very concerned with the perversion of 
democracy. In particular, he distrusted clever politicians who could sway the people with 
smooth rhetoric. He saw that public deliberations could bring with them the danger of 
convincing the people to do something that was actually not in their interest: 
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It does not follow, however, that public deliberations are always equitable; 
they may not be so regarding foreign affairs; I have stated the reason why 
this is so. Thus it is not impossible that a well-governed republic might 
wage an unjust war. Nor it is impossible that the council of democracy 
pass bad decrees or condemn the innocent: but none of this will ever 
happen unless the people is seduced by private interests which some few 
skillful men succeed by their reputation and eloquence to substitute for the 
people's own interest. Then the public deliberation will be one thing, and 
the general will another thing entirely. Do not, therefore, raise the 
democracy of Athens as an objection to me, because Athens was in fact 
not a democracy, but a most tyrannical aristocracy governed by learned 
men and orators. Attend carefully to what happens in any deliberation, 
and you will see that the general will is always for the common good; but 
very often some secret division develops, some tacit alliance which causes 
the assembly's natural disposition to be eluded in favor of private views. 
Then the social body really divides into other bodies whose members 
adopt a general will, good and just with regard to these new bodies, unjust 
and bad with regard to the whole form which each of them dismembers 
Rousseau was concerned about the way minds can be swayed away from what is for the 
general good. The general will is always for the common good, but if something is 
passed that is not for the common good then it is not the general will. This would seem a 
rather circular argument. At any rate, the solution to such a problem is clear, as has 
already been discussed earlier in the chapter. The "social contract" will have to be 
enforced by a central authority with power over all to enforce the common good. Here, 
Rousseau's foundation is paternalism. It rests on the assumption that the people may in 
fact be deluded into acting against their interest. In a well-ordered democracy, however, 
even if this should occur the people have opportunities to redress the situation. The 
danger of Rousseau's argument, the antidemocratic quality, is toxic as it easily leads to a 
centralized power structure to "enforce the common good." Upon this paternalistic 
foundation many an autocratic state has been formed. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and other Later Political Writing, ed. and trans. Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 8. 
Perhaps this was m Tocqueville's mind when he expressed a fear that democracy 
would lead to tyranny by way of paternalism: 
I have not fear that they will meet with tyrants in their rulers, but rather 
with guardians...The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent and 
guided; men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly 
restrained from acting. Such a power does not destroy, but it prevents 
existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes 
and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a 
flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the 
shepherd...Our contemporaries are constantly excited by two conflicting 
passions: they want to be led and they wish to remain free.44 
He goes on to explain why he feels democratic governance is particularly 
vulnerable to this sort of absolute despotism, in ways that echo Machiavelli's concerns: 
I believe that it is easier to establish an absolute and despotic government 
among a people in which the conditions of society are equal than among 
any other; and I think that if such a government were once established 
among such a people, it not only would oppress men, but would eventually 
strip each of them of several of the highest qualities of humanity. 
Despotism, therefore, appears to me peculiarly to be dreaded in 
democratic times. I should have loved freedom, I believe, at all times, but 
in the time in which we live I am ready to worship it. 
Tocqueville's concerns projected into the twentieth century, when democracy did indeed 
face dire threats to freedom, the subject of the next section. 
The New Challenges of Modern Antidemocracy 
The beginning of the Great War brought into sharp focus the new challenges of 
the modern age for democracy. The nineteenth century had been one of great change, 
with technological advance introducing mechanization and the need for resources in an 
unprecedented fashion. It was a world dominated by Europe, having been in large 
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measure carved and split between the various European nation states. Winston Churchill 
describes that European world on the eve of WWI with great nostalgia and fondness: 
Like many others, I often summon up in my memory the impression of 
those July [1914] days. The world on the very eve of its catastrophe was 
very brilliant. Nations and Empires crowned with princes and potentates 
rose majestically on every side, lapped in the accumulated treasures of the 
long peace. All were fitted and fastened—it seemed securely—into an 
immense cantilever. The two mighty European systems faced each other 
glittering and clanking in their panoply, but with a tranquil gaze. A polite, 
discreet, pacific, and on the whole sincere diplomacy spread its web of 
connections over both. A sentence in a dispatch, an observation by an 
ambassador, a cryptic phrase in a Parliament seemed sufficient to adjust 
from day to day the balance of the prodigious structure. Words counted, 
and even whispers. A nod could be made to tell. Were we after all to 
achieve world security and universal peace by a marvelous system of 
combinations in equipoise and of armaments in equation, of checks and 
counterchecks on violent action ever more complex and delicate? Would 
Europe thus marshaled, thus grouped, thus related, unite into one universal 
and glorious organism capable of receiving and enjoying in undreamed of 
abundance the bounty which nature and science stood hand in hand to 
give? The old world in its sunset was fair to see.46 
But if the world of 1914 brings a nostalgic half-smile to mind, the realities of the post war 
era sober even the most committed optimist. The world has always known divides. 
Language, culture, religion, and distance have divided humanity for long centuries. With 
the onset of modernity, some of these divides have been lessened but in their wake others 
have arisen. Antidemocratic ideals divided the world after World War I in ways that 
were previously impossible. The divides of liberal democracy and fascism, along with 
liberal democracy and communism were ignited by the horrors of this great conflict. 
The word fascism is derived from the Italian word describing the symbol of 
ancient Roman government, tightly bound sticks with an axe in the center.47 Mussolini's 
vision of a highly centralized government derived from his desire for a strong state that 
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could never be broken. Fascism, unlike communism, has no overt shared ideology. It is 
difficult to determine with precision the differences between a fascist and a highly 
autocratic regime. This distinction is unnecessary. While autocratic regimes today are 
not deemed fascist, perhaps because of the connotation linked with World War II, for all 
intents and purposes any nation committed to the antidemocratic principles of highly 
centralized power structures with no accountability to the many, shares the essential 
qualities of Mussolini's Italy. They are indeed tightly bound. 
Communism, its ideas first presented in the aforementioned Communist 
Manifesto, was able to wed the nation state because of the Great War. While this 
ultimately ended in a great divorce, the world is a vastly different place today because of 
the marriage. After World War II, with the onset of the Cold War, the more 
institutionalized communism of the USSR courted foreign dignitaries and rabble rousers, 
educating them in the art of revolution and state craft. Communism derived its 
legitimacy from the ideology of absolute equality. Practically speaking, however, this 
equality had to be enforced by a central authority, "a la Rousseau," that was supposed to 
act in the best interest of the people. Hitchhiking from the German example of 
totalitarian rule, the Soviets married ideology with a totalitarian regime that was 
inherently antidemocratic in nature. 
Somewhat ironically liberal democracy in general, and the United States in 
particular as the most powerful liberal democracy post-1945, reacted to this threat by 
quashing fledgling democracies and supporting autocrats that were friendly to Western 
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interests. Confirming the earlier critique of democracy as inherently instable, the U.S. 
feared the advance of Communism in these fledgling democracies and preferred stability 
at all costs. 
If globalized conflict impacted the conflict of liberal democracy versus fascism 
and communism, it also introduced a new divide between nation states and those lacking 
a national identity. In the decolonization era that followed World War II, former colonies 
now faced the task of cobbling together governance over a national territory whose 
boundaries had often been drawn by outsiders. As seen in the post-colonial legacy, a lack 
of identity can have lasting ramifications. In commenting on the loss of identity Neville 
Brown says: 
Loss of identity may by then have been more a fount of radicalism than 
penury per se. Those trapped in grinding poverty are usually more 
concerned to break out than to save humankind at large. The world of the 
near future may likewise contain more people who have been radicalized 
by identity crisis than is currently anticipated either by governments or by 
the literati. The signs are very evident in a swathe of territory extending 
through the Horn of Africa, Arabia and the Gulf to Central Asia.5 
While the radicalization of those in identity crisis as a threat to global security is one 
aspect of this new challenge, another is that experienced internally with chronic 
instability. Whether by frequent coups or by civil war, many of Europe's post-colonial 
holding still harbor antidemocratic legacies. 
Even when valuable resources are discovered in countries with antidemocratic 
currents, transitions to stable democratic rule are often problematic. New resources, such 
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as oil, have seemed to stack the deck against democracy. A dominant rationale is that 
nations wealthy in resources such as oil have no need for parliaments because they "win 
popular acquiescence through distribution rather than support through taxation and 
representation." 
Fueled in part by the nation states made wealthy by resource endowment, the 
transition to market economies has not led to strong democracies, leaving a weaker than 
anticipated link between strong economies leading to strong democracies. As Michael 
Dauderstadt has noted, while the democratization process has stalled out in many 
transition countries, some of the greatest economic successes have been generated from 
authoritarian rule. 
Adding to this is the continuing divide between the "haves" and the "have nots". 
While this divide is not new in origin, the awareness of the divide is more prevalent today 
than ever before, imbuing a seething resentment. The intersect of the post-colonial 
residue and the increase in state power as located in nation states has resulted in a 
discernible "north-south" divide. As noted by Gurr et al: 
The successful political systems of the northern hemisphere have matured 
into two increasingly distinct and internally consistent types: coherent 
multiparty democracies and one-party autocracies. The political patterns 
of Latin America and the postcolonial Third and Fourth worlds are far 
more heterogeneous. Their histories of experimentation with democracy, 
autocracy, and mixed regimes are fraught with instability and few show 
evidence of sustained linear progression toward one or another of the 
increasingly pure types that prevail in the northern hemisphere.54 
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But the story is not rosy for democracy in these northern hemisphere countries 
either. When Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam published the original version of 
Disaffected Democracies, the world seemed cold toward democracy. The Soviet Union 
was becoming more assertive, Nixon had been forced to resign, and Europe was divided, 
with the Western half at times seeming to cower in the shadow of its Soviet neighbors.55 
In the midst of this uncertainty perhaps it is not surprising that Pharr and Putnam's study 
found broad disillusionment with democracy among the high level democracies. The 
results of their updated study in the 1990s, a time of euphoria and optimism concerning 
democracy and its spread, are more troubling. Even with the triumph of democracy over 
communism 25 years later "the low confidence in government in America and other 
Trilateral countries has not only continued but deepened."56 What this portends, I won't 
predict, other than to say this further highlights the need to study and understand 
antidemocracy in the context of history more fully. 
Conclusion 
Dominant today as the most popular form of legitimacy, rule by the many argues 
that government exists at the people's mandate. As this discussion has demonstrated, that 
view has been a minority one across the span of history. Long held in poor esteem, 
democracy was traditionally viewed as little more than mob rule. Decried as inherently 
unstable, Utopian, and prone to dangerous rhetoric, democracy has only recently become 
the government of choice. Autocracy, however, was seen as so powerful that even if a 
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nation escapes its clutches the people remain damaged by their autocratic experience, 
thus predisposing them to an even more extreme subsequent autocracy. 
While innovations in democratic institutions, coupled with advances in 
technology and bureaucracy, have enabled democracy's escape from many of the historic 
critiques, it faced new challenges in the 20th century. Global conflict created great 
ideological divides between governments centered on liberty, governments centered on 
stability, and governments centered on equality. These various governments derived 
their legitimacy from varying locations. Governments centered on stability derived 
legitimacy either as a birthright, or from the idea that strong central governance is in the 
best interest of all since it serves as the key to preserving order. Governments centered 
on equality drew on ideological substantiation for their legitimacy, while claiming to rule 
in a way that reflected the will of the people as their guardians. Governments centered on 
liberty continued their legitimacy by reflecting the will of the people as mandated by the 
people. 
Stability, equality and liberty are all popular values, but at various times in history 
stability and equality have excluded liberty as the weaker and less necessary partner. The 
way governments have reflected antidemocratic undercurrents across time is the subject 
of this study. The exploration continues by looking at those times when those 




"But always the Dark was there, swelling and waning.. .."1 
If democracy is light and antidemocracy dark, then the counterwaves are the times 
when "the dark is rising." Clustered in time, the counterwaves are pockets of strong 
antidemocratic sentiment. As demonstrated by the previous chapter this undertow, until 
more recent history, was the dominant force in governance and world politics. Only in 
the last 200 years has liberal democracy overcome this pull and only in the past few 
decades could liberal democracy be rightly described as the dominant source of 
legitimacy for nation states in the world system. In some sense, then, one might describe 
the counterwaves as inherently conservative movements, a harkening back to the ways of 
a previous order. 
Antidemocracy, however, has evolved in ways that defy this simple description. 
As modernity drew the entire planet into her orbit, the use of power to govern changed in 
meaningful ways as well. This is true for both liberal democracy and autocracy. The 
counterwaves, the first occurring from 1922-1940 and the second from 1957-1977, 
occupy interesting time bands of history. Our first task, then, is to situate the 
counterwaves properly in their historical context, before examining them in general and 
comparative terms. 
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Important Historical Context 
Change occurs on a daily basis, but big events seem to infuse the system with 
energy, and force spurts of intensive change. While the norm is a gradual and 
manageable tension, at times there are earthquakes and eruptions. Shifts in the status quo 
take place and rapid changes in the landscape result. The twentieth century saw 
tremendous and intense times of sudden shifts. To give context to the era of the 
counterwaves, one needs to touch on 4 macro processes, roughly chronological in nature, 
that have shaped democratic failure, particularly as it relates to the counterwaves. These 
processes are: nationalism, colonialism, globalized conflict and de-colonization. 
The relative stasis of the 1800s belied the important processes at work. At the 
dawn of the 19th century, feudal institutions were weakening, and with them the 
personalistic allegiance structures. In place of these structures, more centralized state 
systems emerged empowering legislatures, entities that in turn defined law and society in 
new and malleable ways. This represented a tremendous break from the past. As J.M. 
Roberts wrote: 
To a medieval European the idea that there might not be rights and rules 
above human interference, legal immunities and chartered freedoms 
inaccessible to change by subsequent law-makers, fundamental laws 
which would always be respected or laws of God which could never be 
contravened by those of men, would have been social and juridical, as well 
as theological, blasphemy.3 
One should not lose sight of the fact that a rise in democratic power represented a shift 
away from previous well-ordered social structures. The secularization of culture, the 
sense that history was progressing toward an apex, and the veneration of scientific 
knowledge as the key to limitless progress were all legacies of the Enlightenment, the 
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birth place of liberalism.4 The American and French Revolutions set the stage for 
sweeping change, as "belief in Man, individual Man, his Nature, his Reason, his Rights"5 
advanced the cause of secular humanism, in lock step with democracy. Democracy 
emerged as a viable form of governance when individualism and rationalism accorded 
man with abilities previously possessed only by deities. Scholars of nationalism, while 
disagreeing about much, almost universally affirm this notion of nationalism as filling the 
void left by religion. These broader trends also fed into notions of democratic 
governance and rule of law. In fact, Harold Berman called individualism, rationalism and 
nationalism "the Triune Deity of Democracy." 
The implications of these "modern" ideas permeated the globe. Even those nation 
states that didn't "modernize" following the pattern of the West were swept up by 
changes in social structure. Bernard Lewis illustrates this distinction between traditional 
society and the nation sate. Modernization destroyed the whole apparatus, or "consensual 
order" that had previously operated in traditional society. In that setting, there were all 
sorts of orders in society that were well-entrenched and could exercise a restraining 
influence. To illustrate his point, Lewis uses the example of the report of the French 
ambassador in Turkey in 1786, who pointed out the sultan had nothing like the power of 
the French king, but instead had to consult the military chiefs, the religious chiefs, and 
the heads of departments before making important decisions.8 With the coming of 
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modernity, these traditional checks and balances were eroded. The centralization of 
power strengthened the autocrat and gave him all the methods of surveillance and 
repression common to the nation state.9 Centralized autocracy significantly differs in 
scope from its pre-modern predecessor, just as democracy too represented a departure 
from past governance. 
Some argue nationalism, a key unifying conceptual framework in the 1800s, was 
conceived in order to sell this centralization of power.10 Europe, having recovered from 
Napoleon's misadventures in 1815, was none the less fundamentally changed by the 
experience, and the inability to return to an exact status quo. With the emergence of a 
united Germany in 1871, nearly all of Europe was organized into nation states, with an 
accompanying national identity. What was the impact of this nationalism? The answer 
centers on the question of identity. When a majority of the constituents buy into the idea 
of releasing their small group identity and being subsumed under a larger rubric, 
everything changes. Being Italian took on more meaning than being Venetian. 
Venetians bought into the idea of a united Italy as an important sense of identity. 
Nationalism brought the power of shared identity to bear in a political sense with 
amazing consequences. Newly emerging in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
these nation states have been referred to by Leonard Dudley in stripped down terms as 
"new national information networks."11 
The advent of greater communication capabilities, coupled with transportation 
innovations, facilitated the projection of power and increased both the scope and depth of 
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international relations. Previously remote cultures and populations were subdued and 
subsumed by the European empires. With a sense of identity shaped by European 
nationalism, Europeans accepted the "white man's burden" and set about the task of 
civilizing the globe by setting up distant outposts of colonial power. Europeans had gone 
out into the world, exploring and mapping the globe with ardor from the 1400s forward. 
True of the earlier era of exploration, it was also true during the era of colonization. By 
1900, it is no exaggeration to say that "the peoples of Europe and European stock 
overseas dominated the globe."12 Latin America housed Spain and Portugal, North 
America housed the British and the French, the British had rooms in India while the 
Spaniards were found in the Philippines. The United States forcibly "opened" Japan to 
trade, while Britain fought the Opium Wars in China. The Dutch took up residence in 
Southeast Asia and carved up sections of Africa. That continent was also segmented by 
French and British colonial interests. The Middle East, as well, was divided into 
segments of various European national interests. Europeans imposed national borders, 
along with their governance styles. While most texts couch the Europeans as exploiters, 
one should remember the cash flow spreadsheet rarely worked in favor of the colonizer, 
leading to the famous British cry "No more Indias!" Whatever the motivations, there can 
be no doubt that colonization had far-reaching implications for antidemocracy, as is 
especially seen during the second counterwave of 1957-1977, when the countercry to 
imperialism shaped antidemocracy, a topic that we will return to in our discussion of the 
second counterwave. The process of colonization bore direct impact on the shape of the 
globe, especially when global war was instated. 
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With the global extension of European nation states, European conflicts were also 
exported with relative ease. In 1914, when divisions in the newly unified Germany and 
the newly unified Italy were becoming evident, the European alliance structure ensured 
that any conflict would be monumental. The Great War was devastating as the 
industrialized nation states devoted entire economies to the craft of conflict. With its 
broad scope, it destroyed much. In the words of one young British economist at the 
Versailles peace conference that marked its end: 
We are at the dead season of our fortunes. Our power of feeling or caring 
beyond the immediate questions of our own material well-being is 
temporarily eclipsed...We have been moved beyond endurance and need 
rest. Never in the lifetime of men now living has the universal element in 
the soul of men burnt so dimly.13 
The economic depression that followed the Great War was preceded by a spiritual 
one. Enlightenment ideas, faith in progress and man's positive evolution lay littered on 
the battlefields, casualties in the ideational realm that echoed the many casualties in the 
physical one. This sense of disillusionment can perhaps best be illustrated in the vast 
changes that occurred in the realm of art. While in earlier eras art had rested on shared 
experience, in the years after 1918 art worshipped disintegration. "In Surrealism even the 
notion of the objective disappeared, let alone its representation. As one Surrealist put it, 
the movement meant 'thought dictated in the absence of all control exerted by reason, 
and outside all aesthetic or moral preoccupations.' Through chance, symbolism, shock, 
suggestion and violence the Surrealists sought to go beyond consciousness itself."14 The 
world of art, then, was exhibiting visually the challenge to liberal ideas that shook the 
democratic establishment in the international community. 
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When this Great Depression put on economic garments, liberal democracy 
seemed ill-equipped for dealing with the challenges. If the universal element in the soul 
of men burned dimly, so too did the soul of democracy. The Great War left a devastated 
Europe, hell-bent on revenge instead of restoration. Into this void flowed new ideas, but 
ones that proved poisonous to democracy. As J.M. Roberts has said "The disaster was a 
promising setting for the communists and the fascists, who expected or advocated the 
collapse of liberal civilization and now began to flap expectantly about the enfeebled 
carcass."15 
With the Communist revolution in full swing in Russia, communist evangelism 
sparked fear, with its self-avowed international militarism. Added to this were the 
equally strident fascist threats in Italy, Spain, and Germany. These ideologies have been 
called "the utopia of those who had lost the old Utopias of the Enlightenment, the 
programme of those who had lost faith in other programmes, the prop of those who had 
lost the support of older political and social certainties."16 With the strident recovery of 
Germany and the assertive rise of Japan, global conflict once again enveloped the world. 
It was a truly dark time for those who had so fervently believed in the good will 
and perfection of humanity, embodied by the ideas of the Enlightenment. Communism 
offered a short cut to modernity that promised to side step the problematic inequality that 
plagued liberal democracies with unfettered capitalism. Fascism, on the other hand, 
represented a strength of character and decisive leadership that appealed to those shaken 
by the instability in post-war liberal democracies. Liberal democracy began its retreat. 
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The details of World War II are not especially relevant to this discussion, but the 
state of the world at its close bears direct importance. While the conflict again spread to 
some of the European colonies, it was the Japanese who had the more immediate impact 
on colonial holdings at the war's end. By founding the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere during their rise, the Japanese pillaged the colonies of needed raw materials, but 
also made it difficult for colonial powers after the war to return to the status quo ante by 
delegating issues of local governance. These Asian nations were in no way prepared to 
accept the colonizers anew in the post-war period. The African nations followed suit, 
demanding independence from their colonial overlords. This post-WWII independence 
movement introduced new levels of uncertainty in the governance structures of colonized 
states that had been delineated on a map, but struggled to formulate a national identity. 
The death of the European empires began a torturous journey for many of the former 
colonies, as the new nation states tried to forge an independent identity in an uncertain 
world. For these newly minted nations, the struggle for identity was complicated by 
complex realities. On the one hand, the impetus was strong to invent a national identity 
apart from the colonizers. In most cases, the colonial overlords were well-established, 
Western democracies who sought to inculcate some sort of democratic institutions in 
their colonies. Independence, then, called for a new nationalism to forge a new kind of 
national identity. 
Nationalists texts were addressed both to 'the people' who were said to 
constitute the nation and to the colonial maters whose claim to rule 
nationalism questioned. To both, nationalism sought to demonstrate the 
falsity of the colonial claim that the backward peoples were culturally 
incapable of ruling themselves in the conditions of the modern world. 
Nationalism denied the alleged inferiority of the colonized people; it also 
asserted that a backward nation could 'modernize' itself while retaining its 
cultural identity. It thus produced a discourse in which, even as it 
challenged the colonial claim to political domination, it also accepted the 
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very intellectual premises of 'modernity' on which colonial domination 
was based. 
The nexus of modernization, liberation, and nationalism in the decolonization process 
proved challenging, as this new nationalism often married antidemocracy, in forms 
recognized as national strains of communism or fascism, in the quest for a national 
identity distinct from the colonizers. 
Thus, the impact of these trends of nationalism and modernization, colonization 
and decolonization are interwoven with the story of the counterwaves. They form the 
historical backdrop against which the rise and dominance of antidemocratic sentiment 
was played out. In the case of both counterwaves the voice of democracy was 
overwhelmed by the voices of alternative government choices. It still remains to examine 
these periods of clustered antidemocratic sentiment. 
The Counterwaves 
The discussion now turns to a more mechanical description of the time clusters 
when antidemocratic governance experienced its greatest strength. As mentioned 
previously, Samuel Huntington noted these "reverse waves" in passing, but defined them 
differently. I argue that Huntington did not define the counterwave phenomenon broadly 
enough. Huntington's focus and purpose was different than mine, but his brief 
exploration of the counterwave offers an instructive counterpoint to illuminate the 
rationale underlying this project. Huntington defined the counterwave in terms of those 
democracies that had been converted in the recent wave of democracy, a narrow 
17
 Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World (Tokyo: Zed Books Limited, 1986), 30. 
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conception of the counterwave.18 This project, on the other hand, opens things up to look 
at the impact of antidemocracy on all types of polity, from varying levels of democracy 
through autocracy. This question gives a broader range in which to judge the true power 
of democracy, as a concept that either attracts or repels, across time. 
In the century that followed, in spite of sputters and missteps, the overall trend 
reflects an increase in the mean polity score in the international system. The mean polity 
score reached its first peak in 1921, when the average polity score was 2.13 for the 62 
nations in the system. After this long and fairly steady climb in the mean polity score, 
1922 signaled the beginning of a precipitous decline in the polity score. This was the 
beginning of the first counterwave, a cluster of antidemocratic sentiment that represented 
the reversal of democracy's advance through the nineteenth century and signaled the 
beginning of the first challenge to the liberal ideals that had been birthed and grown 
throughout the Enlightenment. 
The first counterwave (CW1), as seen in Graph 1, occurred from roughly 1922 
until 1940, spanning nearly 2 decades. During that time the mean polity dropped from its 
height of 2.05 in 1921 to a low of-2.24 in 1940, a reversal that took the mean polity score 
back 70 years in history to the year 1870. Of further interest, we find a relatively 
constant number of nations in the international system during this period. 
18
 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
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Graph 1. Mean polity score, 1800-2006. 
In 1921 there were 62 recognized nation states and in 1940, there were 63. In the 
interceding years 8 new nations were created, but others were absorbed keeping the 
overall numbers of nations in the international system fairly steady. 
The second counterwave (CW2) also occurred over a roughly 20 year period. 
After reaching a low in 1940, the polity score began to climb again. By 1946 it had 
climbed back into positive territory again, to a meager .09. It sputtered into negative 
territory again from 1949-1956, before a brief re-emergence onto the positive side of 
things again in 1957. The second sustained counterwave, however, began the following 
year. In 1958, the score had dipped to -.44 and continued a rather steady decline until 
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bottoming out in 1977 at -2.59, an even deeper decline than experienced in the first 
counterwave. 
The counterwaves as distinct bands 
How are the counterwave periods of time any different from the rest of history? 
How is democratic failure distributed across time? Democracy, or those nations scoring 
from 1 to 10 on the polity scale, fails 145 times over the course of the time studied. Of 
these 145 democratic failures, 72 of them take place during counterwave time periods, 
leaving 73 that take place outside of these time periods. This is made significant by the 
fact that the counterwaves account for only 18% of the total time studied. In other words, 
nearly half of all democratic failures are clustered in these narrow time bands. As an 
archeologist digging through the rubble of democratic failure, while shards of destroyed 
democracy are sprinkled throughout the soil layers of history, one discovers 
concentrations of shattered democracy in the time bands of 1922-1940 and 1957-1977. 
The global reach of the counterwaves 
To further the exploration of the importance of the counterwaves, it is useful to 
explore its geographic reach. While most of this work is focused specifically on those 
nations who reach failure threshold, a polity drop of 3 points, it is important to include 
here all those nations that experienced negative polity change during the counterwave. 
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negpol 
• 0 • 1 • 2 • 3 
Figure 1. Nations experiencing negative polity change during counterwaves. (1=CW1,2=CW2, 3=Both) 
It should be noted that some of these countries, shown in Figure 1, only 
experienced slight negative polity change in the counterwave years. By way of 
illustration, take the examples of the first counterwave. Six of the nations (Afghanistan, 
Cuba, Haiti, Ireland, Mongolia and the USSR) only experienced a slight (2 point) drop in 
their polity scores. For 2 of these nations (Afghanistan whose autocracy deepened to -10 
in 1945 and Haiti, who declined more precipitously in 1946) the counterwave initiated a 
process that was brought to completion in the years just outside CW1. The remaining 4 
went on to recover. Ireland, which had dipped to 8 in 1933, recovered its perfect score of 
10 in 1952. Cuba, a weak democracy at 3 that dipped down to 1 in 1928, recovered its 
previous polity score in 1933. Mongolia and the USSR both experienced deepening 
autocracy in the counterwave years, but recovered their less autocratic score of -7 in 1952 
and 1953 respectively. Even these slight variations, and the subsequent recoveries, 
indicate the power of the counterwave years across the board, in strong and weak 
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democracies and even in autocracies, in initiating a more extreme virulence against 
democracy. 
But the extant literature ignores this phenomenon. The literature on 
antidemocracy largely focuses on the extreme cases of Hitler's Germany and Stalin's 
Russia.19 Others focus on antidemocracy generically, providing important scholarship on 
issues of various types of autocratic regimes but without looking at their prevalence in 
particular time bands. These are important contributions but they neglect the 
fundamental scope of the counterwave impact. While the transience and resilience of the 
downturn varied by individual case, which will be addressed in upcoming chapters, the 
prevalence of the downturn has not been fully described. Seeing the geography of the 
counterwaves reinforces not only their importance, but also their prevalence. Figure 1 
reminds us of the impact of the counterwave, even upon nations that did not actually 
reach failure threshold. From the map we can see the impact of negative polity change in 
South America, all of Europe, Central America, huge segments of the island nations, as 
well as the Middle East. Africa certainly did not escape the impact of negative polity 
change, and Asia was involved in its near entirety. The broader geographical spread 
points to international trends at work, and yet these broad trends of antidemocratization 
have been understudied. 
19
 Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966); Robert 
Tucker, "The Question of Totalitarianism," Slavic Review 20, no. 3 (October 1961): 377-382. 
20
 Juan Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000). 
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Figure 2. Nations impacted by the counterwaves. (l=nations failing only in CW1, 2=nations failing only 
in CW2, 3=nations failing outside the counterwaves, 4=nations failing in a counterwave and again 
subsequently) 
Comparing Counterwave 1 and Counterwave 2 
Having established both the global reach and the distinctiveness of the 
counterwave phenomena jointly, I will now turn to comparisons of them individually. 
Do CW 1 and CW 2 reflect the same phenomenon? Are they another example of history 
repeating itself? Do they look the same? Do they look different? Did both counterwaves 
impact the same geographical regions? What about the composition of the 
counterwaves? Was CW 1 composed of the same types of failures as CW 2? Was the 
mechanism for the polity decline consistent for both? 
Differing geography of the counterwaves 
The counterwaves share in common a wide geographic reach. Neither was 
confined to one continent, or even 2, as can be seen in Figure 2. The counterwaves were 
both global. However, it is not fair to say they are identical. There are important 
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differences, even from the standpoint of geography. Western Europe was swamped by 
the first counterwave, but not as effected by the second. Africa and Asia were largely 
outsiders in the first counterwave, while clearly inside participants in the second. 
Interestingly, both counterwaves lapped the shores of Central America, while only the 
second had any great impact on the Middle East. 
This reinforces the notion that not only were the counterwaves global phenomena 
collectively, they were also global phenomena individually. However, the difference in 
the locus of the global phenomena indicates the importance of contrasting them in further 
detail. 
Composition of the counterwaves 
As seen in the first counterwave, a higher percentage of high level democracies 
failed than in CW2. In fact, nearly half of all high level democracies during the 18 year 
period of CW1 experienced failure. This is in contrast to 31% of all high level 
democracies during the 20 year period of CW2 that experienced failure. In CWI, the 
nations that failed had achieved the highest level of institutionalized authority 
characteristics measured for democracies before their failure. In addition, they had all 
been high level democracies for at least 8 years before experiencing failure. In CW2, 
only 2 level 10 democracies failed, France and Malaysia. During the second 
counterwave, high level democracies were more resilient than they had been during 
CWI, with level 10 democracies proving the most resilient of all. 
The other 2 components of democratic failure, mid-level and low level democratic 
failures, were quite comparable in failure rate when comparing CWI and CW2. In CWI 
55% of all democracies characterized as mid-level failed. This is quite comparable to the 
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60% of all democracies characterized as mid-level in CW2. This phenomenon will be 
discussed in more depth in the chapter on dissonant democracy. The failure rate for low 
level democracies remained constant for both CW1 and CW2. In both instances, it was 
45%. Perhaps even more interesting, while the number of nations in the international 
system ballooned between CW1 and CW2, the number of low level democracies 
remained relatively constant. 
Like the mid-level and low level democratic failure rate, autocratic deepening is 
pretty consistent between the 2 counterwaves. In the first counterwave, 23 % of all 
autocracies experienced a deepening of that autocracy, while in the second counterwave 
that percentage dropped to 19%. This may seem like a false comparison since the 
democracies are split out in subsets while all levels of autocracy are treated as a whole. 
To allow for this, one can combine all levels of democracy and compare them with all 
levels of autocracy. If we do this, we find that 48% of all nations that experienced any 
level of democracy failed, while only 23% of nations experiencing any form of autocracy 
experienced a deepening of the autocracy. While the deepening autocracy certainly 
contributes to the counterwave phenomenon, it is quite evident democratic failure bears 
greater responsibility for the counterwaves. 
Interruptions in polity 
At the risk of sounding like a broken record, at its heart, this dissertation is 
concerned with describing change. Change in polity impacts the larger question of 
stability. In the case of the nations under consideration for this study, some nations do 
not have polity scores for the entire time span of the counterwaves. The answers to these 
cases of the disappearing nations provide further distinctions between the counterwaves. 
Why would a nation be missing? It could be that the nation was born during the 
counterwave. This is certainly true of many nations during CW2 as nations declared 
independence from colonizers. At the other end of the spectrum are those nations that 
went out of existence, such as the Baltic nations and Poland, before reappearing on the 
international stage at a later time. By far the largest culprit, however, is an interruption in 
polity. Polity interruptions take on 3 basic subtypes. In some cases, such as with Hitler's 
march across Europe, the nation has been taken over by an external actor. While these 
external takeovers clearly demonstrate a failure in democratic governance, assigning a 
precise polity score is difficult, so a -66 interruption code is the solution. Yet another 
possibility is internal turmoil, such as civil war or lack of a coherent central government. 
In such cases, these nations appear as -77 in the dataset until the situation is resolved. 
For other countries, a state of flux ensues where a specific polity score can't be reached, 
coded as -88. While these scenarios differ significantly in scope and impact, all types of 
interruption represent grave instability. As such, the number of nations not present for 
the entire span of time for the counterwaves can be one indicator of the amount of 
upheaval in the international system. For the first counterwave, 27% of the countries 
were not present for the entire time. In the second counterwave, we see that the number 
of nations not present for the entire time increases dramatically. In fact, 42% of the 
nations were not present over the entire time span of the second counterwave. These 
various interruption codes give us both a way to measure the instability in the 
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As shown in Graph 2, interruptions also spiked around the counterwave time 
spans. In the first counterwave, 25 observations were excluded because of external 
takeover. In the second counterwave, the number of external takeovers is much lower. 
Only 5 countries qualify as -66 during this time span. This is yet another indicator of the 
differences between the 2 counterwaves. The interruptions in polity that characterized the 
second counterwave were due to internal unrest (civil war and collapse of the state), 
while direct external military intervention was a more prominent feature of C W 1 . 
Increasing complexity, more moving parts 
The world was a more complex place at the beginning of the second counterwave, 




o o o o o o o o 
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 
O O O O O O O O 
a i o ^ H i N o o ^ t i n u j 
0 0 < T t O ? l C r > C n C T i < T i C T » 
0 o o o 
r» oo en o 
01 CT> CT> O 
<H rH rH ( N 
Year 
——Nation States — A v e r a g e Polity Score 




about the 2 counterwaves is the proliferation of nation states that occurred in the interim 
between the first counterwave and the second, as can be seen in Graph 3. 
During the years of the first counterwave (1922-1940), 70 states comprised the 
international system. This stands in stark contrast to the number of nations in CW2. In 
the time span from 1957-1977 there were 142 nations in the international system, in other 
words the number of states in the system more than doubled. What happened to cause 
this proliferation? The international system underwent a period of fragmentation. Larger 
territorial entities broke into smaller component pieces. The biggest contributor to this 
phase of fragmentation was decolonization. In the post WWII era, the international 
system experienced a time of great flux and change. While upheaval in conflict is a 
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foregone conclusion, the dramatic shifts that were sparked by WWII may seem less 
obvious. In the aftermath of WWII, the great colonizing European nations lost sway over 
their colonies. En masse, colonial holdings in Africa and Asia defected, declared 
independence and embarked on the path of national governance. Many new nations were 
born. In Graph 3, it is evident the sharpest spike in the birth of nations occurs during the 
second counterwave. When the somewhat arbitrarily drawn boundary lines of the 
colonial era proved untenable to governance, conflict erupted again. Civil wars, conflict 
over power, and power vacuums all contributed to an era of chaos that approached 
anarchy in some nations. Newly independent governments had to deal with myriad 
issues that had been temporarily plastered over by the colonial rulers, who had oftentimes 
dumped copious amounts of capital into the colonial empires. 
This seismic movement marks a point of contrast from the first counterwave. The 
flavor is different. While the first counterwave follows the march up to WWII, the 
second counterwave mirrors the international aspects of the Cold War. It is safe to assert 
that the world is a more complex place with 142 nations than it was with 70. This 
increase in complexity, and in moving parts, is especially characteristic of the second 
counterwave. 
Conclusion 
The counterwaves represent time bands of history when the tide of antidemocracy 
rose precipitously. Impacting even autocracies, the counterwaves subsumed democracies 
of all levels and degrees to an even greater extent. The counterwave was global in reach, 
and distinctly recognizable on the canvas of history. 
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That canvas gave color to the counterwaves. Against the white hope in mankind 
kindled by the Enlightenment, the counterwaves strike more somber shades. Faith in 
individualism, rationality, forward progress had stoked the fires of modernity. With 
modernization came the emergence of the nation state, with innovative centralized power 
structures. Secular humanism struck a divide between belief in the divine and the newly 
emerging societies, while borrowing religious capital in the terms of fervor and 
passionate belief. 
When the giant Enlightenment fell during World War I, he scarred the 
international system with the lasting imprint of his fall. Disillusionment reigned. New 
ideologies were birthed in the turmoil. Communism and fascism stepped in to interpret 
events and bring new promise. These new ideologies, antidemocratic in their foundation 
and applications, gave birth to the first counterwave. 
While Europe may have been the epicenter of the first counterwave, 
antidemocracy rang around the world. The first counterwave followed the world's first 
real experiment with globalized conflict. Antidemocracy was built upon the modern 
ideologies of communism and fascism, which fed off the instability of that conflict. 
The 2 counterwaves are different in some important ways. And yet, the second 
counterwave also echoes the first. It followed a period of globalized conflict, but was 
experienced by a somewhat different set of nation states. Some who experienced the first 
counterwave were inoculated in 1945, but for many other nations, antidemocracy was 
still relevant. Antidemocracy was still built on the echoes of communism and fascism. 
In the antidemocratic movements that swept Africa, Asia, parts of Europe and Latin 
America from 1957-1977, both the communist and fascist echoes strongly presided. 
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Newly independent states often aligned with either the far left or the far right as the third 
great globalized conflict, the Cold War, got underway. 
Not all nation states were equally vulnerable during the counterwaves. One of the 
most interesting findings of the study of these counterwaves was high level democracy's 
disproportionate vulnerability. The counterwaves represent one important way to 
conceive of democratic failures. In order to add to the understanding of democracy's 
vulnerability, however, it is also helpful to study failure against the backdrop of broader 
history. The next chapter turns to an in-depth look specifically at high level democratic 
failure, both inside and outside of the counterwaves. 
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CHAPTER IV 
WHEN COHERENT DEMOCRACY FAILS 
Clusters of antidemocracy reached full concentration in the counterwave years, 
but antidemocracy escapes the confines of these time bands. In seeking to more fully 
describe the phenomenon of democratic failure, we too must leave the confines of the 
counterwave years. For the rest of this work, the counterwave will serve as a primary 
frame of reference and point of comparison, but our focus will shift to a broader 
conception of antidemocracy, as experienced by democracies of 3 varying concentrations. 
Failure in the most concentrated form of democracy, high level democracy, leads off this 
trio. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the Polity dataset measures the 
institutionalized authority characteristics present in governance structures. In particular, 
it focuses on the degree to which restraint of authority is present in the institutions of 
government. Restraint in governance is a characteristic of particular import to 
democracy, which finds its legitimacy in the bridle of the people. In non-democracies, 
legitimacy might be found in bloodlines, military power, ideology, or party membership, 
each of which offer their own rules of engagement, but only in democracy does 
legitimacy rest expressly in the people's choice, a mediated expression of the rule by the 
many. 
High level democracies, to return to our subject, are those polities organized 
around this concept of restraint. To the highest extent, this grouping is internally 
coherent. High level democracy can be operationalized as a polity "in which (a) political 
participation is fully competitive, (b) executive recruitment is elective and (c) constraints 
77 
on the chief executive are substantial."1 In other words, institutions have been 
constructed to support the underlying ideals of democracy, namely regularized elections 
with a continuing atmosphere of restrained executive power. Ideals, as we have 
discussed in previous chapters, shape institutions. This, of course, links the study of the 
failure of democratic governmental institutions to the faltering of the democratic ideal. 
Examining Decline in High Level Democracies 
While the concept of democracy has been around for centuries, high level 
democracy is a fairly recent innovation. The United States formed the vanguard in 1809, 
but only in the later years did high level democracy emerge across a broader scale. 
In Graph 4, the relative novelty of the onset of high level democracy as a force in the 
international system is demonstrated. High level democracies, non-existent in 1800, 
comprised less than 10% of all the nation states in the world system until the twentieth 
century. While only 9 nations were high level democracies in the 1800s, 66 more would 
join their ranks in the 1900s with 10 more joining after the millennial change. Over the 
course of the time covered by this study, 86 nations have been high level democracies at 
one point or another, some remaining so for the duration of the time under study while 
others have reverted to lower levels of democratic governance, or even fallen into 
autocracy. There are more high level democracies today than at any other point in 
history. By the end of 2006, high level democracies comprised over 40% of the world 
system. 
1
 The Polity IV User's Manual describes as "coherent" those having a score of 7 or higher. I have raised 

















o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 * - i ( N m > * L r > U 3 i ^ o o ( n o < - H < N m ^ - L r > i " D i ^ o o a i o 
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o c n c n c n c r i c n C T i C T i C T i c x i a i o 
r H r H r H T - l r H i H r H r H r H r H r H r H r H i - l v H r H r H r H . r H r H C N 
Year 
Graph 4. The percentage of high level democracies in the world system. 
The chapter focuses on the failure of these high level democracies, as tracked in Graph 4. 
Even though it has been discussed in earlier portions, it is probably good to recap the 
description of high level democracies. High level democracies are not perfect. Nations 
can be high level democracies, even before they let women vote. The United States was 
a high level democracy, even during the years before the civil war with institutionalized 
slavery. There is some part of us that thinks this ought not to be. In our minds we equate 
democracy with liberty, justice and equality of opportunity. Indeed, democracy does 
cohabitate with these ideals, and yet high level democracy has existed 
2
 Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 
3 (Summer 1983): 212. 
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even when these ideals were not perfectly expressed. Just as democracy as an ideal has 
evolved over time, so too has high level democracy. So, how can we deal with the 
changes in what high level democracy has looked like across the span of this study? 
There are 2 concepts crucial to our discussion of how this can be. The first of 
these is historical context. Was Athens a democracy? Certainly not by any standards that 
we would accept today, and yet when comparing its governance style to those of all the 
nations in its sphere of influence, it was distinctively democratic in the way that it made 
its decisions. Was the United States a democracy even when it had institutionalized 
slavery? If we use the same format, looking at participation in governance, the U.S. was 
a recognizable democracy, very different in its decision making processes than any of its 
contemporaries. 
More importantly, however, is a return to our focus on institutionalized authority 
characteristics. In measuring democracy, as mentioned before, this study has utilized 
only the observable institutional environment. In the case of high level democracies, 
there are few institutionalized hangovers from either incomplete democratic 
transformation or autocratic remnants. So, while high level democratic governance is not 
perfect when compared to ideal democratic governance, it is institutionally distinct. 
General Findings 
There are 35 nation states that represent 42 incidents of high level democratic 
failure, as seen in Figure 3. Obviously, there are some repeat offenders within the ranks 
of the high level democratic failures. Greece fails 3 times, (1915, 1936, 1949) as does 
Pakistan (1958, 1977, 1999). France (1940, 1958) Turkey (1971, 1980) and Lesotho 
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Figure 3. High level democratic failures. 
(1970, 1998) have each experienced failure as a high level democracy twice. The subject 
of repeat offenders will be covered in more depth in the next chapter, where repeated 
high level democratic failure will be situated within the context of the repeated failure of 
mid and low level democracies. 
Falling fast and far 
Within the 35 nation states that have experienced high level democratic failure, 
there are 2 identifiable subsets. There are those members that barely meet the qualifying 
criteria, experiencing a minor slide of only 3 or 4 points in their polity score. Given the 
high level of institutionalization of democracy within this group, it would be reasonable 
to assume that when failure occurs it occurs as a downgrading of democracy, an erosion 
of democracy to a lower level. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that most of the high 
level democratic failures would consist of minor slides. Instead, this group is a distinct 
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minority, making up only 14% of the failures. The rest of the high level democracies 
failed dramatically. In fact, only 11 of the cases maintained even the lowest levels of 
democracies, the rest swung over into the autocratic territory. In other words, only 30% 
of these high end democracies remained democracies in any sense of the word. The other 
70% experienced such decline that they were characterized as autocracies. Even when 
we include those that experienced minor levels of democratic failure, the average polity 
drop was 10 points. Of the majority of high level democracies that experienced deep 
democratic failure, the shift was so profound that they were in the bottom quadrant of 
autocracy after having occupied the heights of democracy. 
Of equal importance to the depth of the failure is the rapidity of the failure. Have 
high end democracies historically failed gradually or quickly? A gradual decline in 
democratic values, with a slow deprivation of democratic rights seemed the only way a 
populace who had instituted democratic governance would tolerate the deprivation of 
such rights, having been lulled into a false sense of security. This assumption proved 
incorrect. The vast majority of the declines were precipitous, taking place over the 
course of a year. In fact, only 4 of the cases took longer than a year. So, not only were 
the failures deep, they were dramatic. High level democracies fall far and fast. 
These findings are of particular concern in a world where high level democracies 
now make up nearly half of the system. The implications of cause for concern become 
even more apparent when we look at the nature of these high level democracies. 
As mentioned before, high level democracies are composed of nations with a 
polity score of 8, 9, or 10. As one might expect, level 10 democracies have experienced 
3
 The cases referenced are: Finland 1930, Estonia 1933, Ecuador 2000, Venezuela 2001, Greece 1949, and 
Sri Lanka 1982. 
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the greatest level of stability. Unfortunately, the number of level 10 democracies in the 
international system is quite small. In 2006, there were 35 nation states that were number 
10 democracies, representing only 21% of the international system. Of even more 
concern, these nations were concentrated in the West. Of the non-Western nations who 
are number 10 democracies, only 5 nations were both non-Western and non-island 
states.4 
Why is this of concern? Because while level 10 democracies have experienced 
failure, most especially concentrated within the first counterwave as will be discussed 
later in this chapter, level 8 and 9 democracies make up the larger contingent of high 
level democratic failure. Table 1 lists all the high level democracies that have 
experienced failure. This table demonstrates a further 2 things. First of all, even number 
10 democracies are not immune to failure. Secondly, level 8 and 9 high level 
democracies are even more vulnerable. This should raise our concerns about the impacts 
of a future counterwave on high level democracy. 
One might justifiably ask how these high end democratic failures are distributed 
relative to the counterwave. Interestingly, these high end failures seem to happen most 
frequently during counterwaves. In fact, nearly 60% of the failures occur during the 2 
counterwaves. This is especially striking since the sum total of the time represented in 
the 2 counterwaves, a total of 40 years, only represents 18% of the total time studied. 
Sixty percent of all high level democratic failures occur in a time span that represents 
18% of the total time. 
4
 These countries are Chile, Cos,ta Rica, Uruguay, Mongolia and Israel. 
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Graph 5. Percentage of high level democratic failure versus the average polity score. 
What does this mean? Well, as shown in Graph 5, the highest percentage of high 
level democratic failures occurred at the end of the first counterwave, when nearly 45% 
of all the high level democracies in the international system experienced failure. While 
the same graph shows the continuance of high level democratic failure during the second 
counterwave and beyond, it demonstrates the particular toxicity of the first counterwave 
to high level democracy. 
The relationship between the counterwaves and high level democratic failure is 
even more striking when comparing the percentage of high level democracies in the 
world system to the counterwave years. In returning to Graph 4, one sees that the 
percentage of high level democracy in the world system tracks with both counterwaves, 
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especially in the period of 1922-1940, but also we see the decrease of high level 
democracy in the world system in the second counterwave, 1957-1977. 
Distinctions of high level democracy's progression and recession 
As has already been mentioned, a particularly disproportionate number of high 
level democracies suffered failure during the counterwaves. There are some interesting 
distinctions between CW 1 (1922-1940) and CW 2 (1958-1977). During the first 
counterwave, many of the high level democracies that had been born in the early 1900's 
failed. While high level democracies had been coming into existence at a rate of several 
a year, by the onset of the first counterwave in 1922, the birth rate of high level 
democracies lurched to a halt. In fact, during the first counterwave no new high level 
democracies were born. 
In contrast, during the years of the second counterwave, high level democracies 
continued to come into existence. Oftentimes, however, the life spans of these high level 
democracies were quite short-lived, as decolonized nation states came to grips with the 
complexities of their new-found independence. 
Even those high level democracies born during the second counterwave that 
escaped failure in the counterwave itself, have proven less than resilient in the 
intervening years. In fact, only 29% of the high level democracies born during the 
second counterwave have managed to survive through 2006. Thus, 61% of the high level 
democracies born during the second counterwave had failed by 2006. 
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Mechanism of Democratic Failure 
Looking at the Table 2, we can see some striking differences in the way high level 
democracies failed. Again, there are important contrasts between the first and second 
counterwaves. In the first counterwave, external takeovers were the most common form 
of high level democratic failure. While the counterwave moved beyond Hitler's march, 
the aggression of the Third Reich bears the lion's share of responsibility for high level 
democratic failure in the first counterwave, with repression and coups playing a less 
prominent role. Civil war is completely absent as a cause of high level democratic failure 
in CW1. In contrast, external takeovers had no role to play in the second counterwave. 
Here, coups play the leading role, with repression as a secondary cause and civil wars a 
distant third. When we move look at those high level democratic failures that took place 
outside the counterwave, we find yet another striking difference, with repression taking 
the lead role as a cause of high level democratic failure, coups as a secondary cause and 
external takeovers and civil wars tied for a distant third place. 






External Takeover 60% 
Repression 20% 
Coup 20% 
Civil War 0% 
External Takeover 0% 
Repression 34.3% 
Coup 53.3% 
Civil War 13.3% 
External Takeover 6% 
Repression 50% 
Coup 38% 
Civil War 6% 
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Objections to these Findings 
I suspect few would argue studying high level democratic failure is unimportant. 
I, also, suspect that this chapter will still manage to find controversy, centering around 2 
main objections. 
The first objection centers on the argument that these aren't high level 
democracies. Who in their right mind would render 1960 Laos a high level democracy? 
Since when can Ecuador be considered a high level democracy? This discussion is 
entirely uninteresting because it includes many countries that are clearly not high level 
democracies. These clearly are not consolidated democracies, objectors might say. 
How, one might ask, can we recognize a consolidated democracy? Isn't one of 
the primary characteristics, aside from its coherence, the fact that it hasn't failed. I'm 
certainly not the first one to observe these problems with the whole concept of 
consolidation, but let us admit from the outset that the consolidation argument is not a 
valid one, since one of the primary means of identifying a consolidated democracy is by 
noticing it hasn't experienced failure, an essentially circular argument. 
Setting aside the issue of consolidation, let's acknowledge that not all of the 
countries that make up the high level democracy group are equal. In fact, even from the 
standpoint of coherence, there is some variance in this group. 
Having looked at the constituents of high level democratic failure, some may 
argue that the level 8 and 9 democracies are unimportant, and the only ones to study and 
include in an examination of democratic failure are those who have achieved a score of 
5
 J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and 
Facilitating Conditions," in Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in 
Comparative Perspective, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1992), 58-70. 
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10. Obviously, I think the weight of the evidence lies in the opposite view. It is rare to 
be introduced to even high level democracy without some remnant of past imperfections. 
Only 17 nations out of the 86 nation states that have ever been high level democracies, 
managed to debut at 10 when they first became high level democracies. Eleven of the 17 
did so after 1945, when democracy had won a significant battle against fascism. So, we 
see it is quite rare to have one's house in full order even when it comes to institutional 
coherence within a democratic government, upon the initial entrance into high level 
democracy. The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Ireland, and 
France all debuted at less than 10, and yet today all are vibrant democracies. The 
possibility to be a vibrant democracy lies within each nation who reaches the threshold of 
high level democracy, and yet we somehow are tempted to think differently of the 
potential of Ghana and Indonesia, both level 8 as of 2006, than we do of the United 
Kingdom, an 8 in 1901. And yet, perfectly coherent democracies are today present in 
Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa. 
A second likely objection argues that these aren't democratic failures. When 
looking at this list we see Hitler's European conquest as the demise of the highest level 
democracies. This doesn't constitute a failure of democracy. As anyone can readily 
attest, when the threat was removed, these nations readily returned to democratic 
governance. In addition, some of the cases above were clearly not democratic failure in 
the traditional sense. While democracy may have faltered, it clearly did not fail, 
objectors may say. 
Here's my defense. In thinking about Europe during WWII, one has only to ask: 
Were Danes living under democratic governance in 1940? What about the Dutch? 
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Norwegians? Of course they were not. They were living under the Third Reich, in 
conditions that could hardly be called democratic. This qualifies as a failure of 
democracy. It does, however, raise interesting questions about the stamina of the 
democratic ideal when trampled by external forces, a subject which could form the 
subject of another dissertation. It also highlights the ebb and flow of democracy as a 
palatable idea, as discussed in the second chapter of this work. 
Another objection argues that some of the cases aren't sufficient to constitute 
democratic failure. We could take the example of Finland, as an example, which some 
have argued is a case of resilient democracy, not of democratic failure.6 Let's simply talk 
about this example in order to elucidate why it should be classified as a democratic 
failure. This is one of the more complex cases of democratic failure and requires a bit 
more historical background to make heads or tails of the situation, since it occurred in the 
years following a civil war in Finland, which began in 1918, that had also centered on 
anti-Communist sentiments. No discussion of the failure of democracy in Finland can 
make sense without a discussion of the Lapua movement. This movement, initially more 
nationalist and anti-communist in nature but turning to more extremist sentiments, 
confronted a Communist Youth Movement in late November 1929 and made a violent 
end to the meeting and resulting in a demand for the ban of all communist activities. The 
movement then spread nationwide and by 1930 the government outlawed all communist 
newspapers, called new elections in which the Communists could not take part, and 
passed anti-Communist laws that resulted in constitutional changes limiting the freedom 
6
 Alan Siaroff, "Democratic Breakdown and Democratic Stability: A Comparison of Interwar Estonia and 
Finland," Canadian Journal of Political Science 32, no. 1 (March 1999): 118. 
7
 This movement actually attempted an anti-government coup in 1932. 
of the press. Thus began the democratic downturn. It was followed by a hotly contested 
presidential election in 1931, where the Lapua movement promised violence if their 
candidate was not elected, and were thus able to strong-arm their way into the 
presidency.9 But, their dominance did not prove long-lasting. In early 1932, an uprising 
occurred in a small town north of Helsinki and was quickly supported by the Lapua. The 
call was for a new patriotic government. The state responded quickly, the army, though 
divided, backed the government and the rebels surrendered as the movement failed to 
garner public support. In the wake of this violence, the Lapua movement was banned and 
support for parliament and rule of law was retained.10 Even so, another 13 years passed 
before the nation would return to the high level of democracy that it possessed before the 
Lapua movement's initiative. Still, in 1944 Finland once again became a number 10 
democracy and has remained one ever since. 
While Finland's experience was indeed one of a lesser extent of democratic 
failure, we can see from our brief history given that the impact was quite evident. It also 
serves to demonstrate the difference between high level democracy, and the lower 
variants. Even though Finland did not descend into abject autocracy, the decrease in 
quality of democracy is important to consider, and still meets the failure threshold. 
Conclusion 
High level democracies have been particularly vulnerable to en masse failure, as 
shown by their presence in the counterwaves. When high level democracy fails, it has 
8
 Alan Siaroff, "Democratic Breakdown and Democratic Stability: A Comparison of Interwar Estonia and 




 Ibid., 119. 
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also failed dramatically. With few exceptions, the failure of high level democracy has 
been catastrophic as the polity pendulum swings far into autocracy. This trend is true of 
level 10 democracies, but even more so of high level democracies with less than perfect 
scores. 
Recent trends have placed high level democracy at the forefront of polity type in 
the international system, but these less than perfect democracies still constitute a large 
portion of high level democracy's forward progress. History would teach us that, just as 
these polities made rapid transitions to democracy, their demise can indeed up rapid as 
well. 
Having tracked the trends of high level democratic decline, we will now turn our 
attention to the way dissonant democracies fare, to examine points of similarity and 
difference with their more institutionally coherent high level democracy counterparts. 
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CHAPTER V 
WHEN DISSONANT DEMOCRACY FAILS 
Having studied failure in democracies that are coherent, we now turn our attention 
to failure in dissonant democracies. What is a dissonant democracy? It is a political state 
of organization in which not all components mesh. That is to say, the aspects of 
democracy are disjointed and confused. There is dissonance in the system. An 
institutionally coherent democracy, operationally defined, consists of fully competitive 
political participation, where those in power are both elected and constrained.1 In 
institutionally incoherent democracies, at least one of these aspects is less than fully 
developed. In these dissonant democracies, elements clash. Internal cohesion is absent. 
An inherently competitive situation results, not between competing political actors but 
between incomplete democracy and incomplete autocracy. By definition, then, one 
would expect these incoherent democracies to be either transient or to experience a high 
level of conflict, whether violently expressed or otherwise. One aim of this chapter is to 
discover whether this expectation is realized. 
Dissonant democracies have not been wholly ignored by scholars. Exercising a 
full range of philological creativity, scholars have variously referred to low and mid-level 
democracies as hybrid regimes,2 pseudo-democracies,3 semi-democracies,4 illiberal 
1
 Polity IV User's Manual, 14. 
2
 Larry Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 21-
35. 
3
 William Case, "New Uncertainties for an Old Pseudo-Democracy: The Case of Malaysia," Third World 
Quarterly 37, no. 1 (October 2004): 83-104; Frederic Volpi, "Pseudo-Democracy in the Muslim World" 
Third World Quarterly 25, no. 6 (2004): 1061-1078. 
4
 William Case, "Can the "Halfway House" Stand? Semidemocracy and Elite Theory in Three Southeast 
Asian Countries," Comparative Politics 28, no. 4 (July 1996): 437-464. 
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democracies5 and incomplete democracies.6 These variously labeled entities have not 
been entirely ignored as to their propensity to experience failure. In fact, dissonant 
democracies have been broadly described as unstable. Several scholars, in fact, have 
noted that coherence on either end of the spectrum, whether as a democracy or autocracy, 
is associated with stability. Studies have looked at newly formed dissonant democracies 
in terms of propensity for conflict, and of course, the more dominant question, at the 
obstacles to their consolidation. If one had to sum up what all these scholars conclude, 
we could safely assert broad agreement that dissonant democracies are problematic. 
Our focus on dissonant democracies will center upon a division of the term. Our 
definition of a failure in democracy, namely a 3 point fall in the democracy score, creates 
3 subcategories of democracy, high level democracy, mid-level democracy and low level 
democracy. In the highest tier, most elements of democracy are present with an utter 
absence of autocratic elements. When we descend into mid-level and low level 
democracies, however, the dissonance becomes obvious. Here, we find an incomplete 
democratization process in competition with remaining elements of autocracy. 
5
 Vedi Hadiz, "The Rise of Neo-Third Worldism? The Indonesian Trajectory and the Consolidation of 
Illiberal Democracy," Third World Quarterly 25, no. 1 (2004): 55-71; Fareed Zakaria, The Future of 
Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007). 
6William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Political Support for Incomplete Democracies: Realist vs. Idealist 
Theories and Measures," International Political Science Review 22, no. 4 (October 2001): 303-320. 
7 Ted Robert Gurr, "Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971," American Political Science 
Review 68, no. 4(December 1974): 1482-1504; Robert Harmel, "Gurr's 'Persistence and Change' Revisited: 
Some Consequences of Using Different Operationalizations o f Change of Polity,'" European Journal of 
Political Research 8, no. 2 (June 1980): 189-214. 
8Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security 
20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 36-37. 
9
 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political 
Institutions and Well-Being in the World 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); 
Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O' Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela eds., Issues in Democratic 
Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1992); Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). 
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To consolidate the idea of mid-level and low level democracy, let's look at some 
specific examples. The failure of mid-level democracy in Chile in 1973 has been much 
studied, because of the implication of external involvement. Even in the 1800s, Chile 
was moving towards democracy and enjoyed regular competitive elections for civilians, 
even in the midst of a civil war in 1891. After regressing to authoritarianism in 1924-32, 
democratic governance was re-instituted and remained stable until the Allende 
government, in the late 1960s, experienced "polarization, disorder and breakdown."10 
With Pinochet's military takeover, the opposition was ruthlessly oppressed and 
suppressed. Chile in the 1960s is a good example of mid-level democracy. It features 
regularized elections cycles, constraints on executive power, but with an autocratic 
undertow. The same could be said for other mid-level democracies that subsequently 
experienced failure, from the French democracy in 1851 which succumbed to the coup of 
Louis Napoleon, to Haiti's difficulties with sustaining democracy in the 1990s with the 
ouster of Aristide.'l 
In low level democracies, the accent falls more heavily on autocracy. Take, for 
example, the case of Cambodia in 1997. Wracked with instability and autocratic 
governance for years, in 1993 the United Nations organized elections, paving a slight 
pathway toward democracy. The 2 main political factions, also militarized, shared power 
until the approach of the next election, when only one would be in charge. Neither side 
10
 Alexander Wilde, "Irruptions of Memory: Expressive Politics in Chile's Transition to Democracy," 
Journal of Latin American Studies 31, no. 2 (May 1999): 479. 
11
 Robert Locke, Ray Cubberly and D. Enys Benoist d'Azy "A New Memoire on the French Coup d'Etat 
of December 2, 1851," French Historical Studies 12, no. 4 (Autumn 1982): 566; Pamela Constable, 
"Dateline Haiti: Caribbean Stalemate," Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-1993): 175. 
95 
was prepared to let go of power, so armed conflict was the result. This backdrop of 
conflict is echoed in many cases where barely expressed democracy is sucked under by 
complex social, economic, and political undercurrents. 
These examples highlight the differences between the coherent democracies 
discussed in the previous chapter, and the dissonant democracies that will occupy our 
time in this one. This chapter will focus on discussing, comparatively and jointly, mid-
level and low level dissonant democracy in terms of their context within the 
counterwaves, their durability and stability as well as their status as repeat offenders for 
the crime of democratic failure. 
Geography of Dissonant Democratic Failure 
Dissonant democracies' failures, when considered collectively, have encompassed 
a good portion of the globe in their scope. As can be seen in Figure 4, mid-level 
democratic failure has impacted most of South America, as well as large portions of 
Africa, Europe and the Middle East. South America, in particular, has been particularly 
impacted by this form of democratic failure, as nearly the entire land mass has 
experienced mid-level democratic failure at some point during the time under study. The 
portions of the globe that have been insulated from this type of democratic failure have 
largely done so because they have either remained autocratic, because they have 
maintained high level democracies, or because they have instituted democracy after the 
counterwaves and have thus largely escaped mid-level democratic failure. 
12 
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Figure 4. Mid-level democratic failures. 
The broad geographical reach of mid-level democratic failure demonstrates 2 
things. First of all, it shows the penetration of the democratic ideal in areas that were 
previously dismissed as hostile to democracy, either due to cultural or economic 
arguments, both of which abound. It also shows the historic vulnerability of democracy 
in those regions, raising questions about regional ability to sustain democracy once it has 
been instituted. 
As can be seen in Figure 5, low level democratic failure was also a widespread 
phenomenon in this study, although the geographical impact lighted in different places. 
Some geographical similarity is shared with both types of dissonant democracy. The 
western portion of South America has been impacted by both mid and low level 
democratic failure, sharing this experience with France and certain portions of the Middle 
East and Africa. However, low level democratic failure brings Asia into the melee, and 
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Figure 5. Low level democratic failures. 
area that had largely avoided the impact of mid-level democracy and thus escaped the 
experience of mid-level democratic failure as well. 
The Counterwave and Dissonant Democracies 
A primary task is to examine dissonant democracy in light of the counterwaves. 
To accomplish this, CW1 and CW2 will be examined comparatively, while also 
comparing the failures of dissonant democracy that have taken place outside the confines 
of the counterwaves. We will examine the way these democracies failed, the level to 
which external takeovers played a role, the average polity drop experienced when 
initially reaching failure threshold as well as when reaching the deepest point of failure. 
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Recovery of democracy by those in the counterwaves will also be discussed to provide 
points of comparison for the long-term toxicity of the counterwaves on dissonant 
democracies. This discussion will fold both types of dissonant democracies, mid-level 
and low level, into one, while discussing important differences as well. 
General description 
Some general description is in order when comparing the counterwaves, both to 
each other and to the failures that occurred outside the counterwaves. For dissonant 
democracies, 45% of all failures occurred within the counterwaves. This percentage, 
while somewhat lower than the percentage of high level democracies that failed during 
the counterwaves, is nonetheless significant, demonstrating the impact of dissonant 
democracy's failure. It also points to the differences in the clustering of dissonant 
democratic failure. 
In terms of general numbers, low level democracy was the dominant form of 
dissonant democracy until roughly 1960, when mid level democracy began a journey of 
ascendance. Both types of dissonant democracy suffered dramatic decline during the 
years of the second counterwave, but in the years following the CW2, when democracy 
was again in resurgence, mid-level democracy experienced the more significant rise. 
The rise and fall of the fortunes of dissonant democracy appears in even greater detail in 
Graph 6, which shows low level democracy's initial dominance of dissonant democracy, 
until the gap narrows in the 1950s and low level democracy emerges from the second 
counterwave as very much the minor player. 
We can also see dissonant democracy's relationship with the counterwave. Low 
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Graph 6. Dissonant democracy in the world system versus the average polity score. 
never completely recovered. A player in the international system, especially from 1870-
1930, by the end of the time studied, it represented a mere 5% share of the international 
system, down from its peak influence of 21% at the onset of WWI. 
Mid-level democracy has quite a different trajectory, again as shown in Graph 6. 
Clearly the junior partner of dissonant democracy, it actually increased in share of the 
world democracy market during the first part of the counterwave, even as low level 
democracy continued its free-fall, before experiencing a sharp downturn in the latter 
years of CW2. Its sharp rise, beginning in the late 1970s, tracks closely with mean 
polity's recovery from CW2. 
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Reaching failure threshold 
One of the constants across time and space as far as mid-level democratic failures 
is the average time taken to reach failure threshold. Only 2 cases, Singapore and Syria, 
took more than a year and both took place within the second counterwave. In spite of 
these deviations, the average remains a year for those failure taking place inside the 
counterwaves as well as those taking place outside. This is a significant finding. No 
matter when the failures occurred, mid-level democracy has fallen rapidly. This is true in 
spite of the variance in the ways in which democratic failure occurs. Whether by means 
of a coup, a civil war, external takeover, or repression, the decrease in polity score has 
taken a nosedive in short order. The bit by bit retraction of democratic freedoms has 
been the historic exception not the rule. This, of course, furthers the conclusion reached 
in the previous chapter, where it was shown that high level democracies declined rapidly. 
While rapid decline is nearly universally true of mid-level democracies, we find 
that more low level democracies have taken longer than a year to meet failure threshold. 
Eight low level democracies took at least 2 years to fail, with Guyana meeting failure 
threshold in 1980, 13 years after its initial decline. It seems somewhat counterintuitive 
that those with more democratic institutions, namely mid-level and high level 
democracies, fail quickly, while the most exceptions to this rule of rapid failure are found 
within the set where democracy is most weakly expressed. 
While failure threshold was reached, in most cases, quickly both inside and 
outside the counterwaves, there are some comparative differences in the degree of 
negative change experienced when that failure threshold was first reached, as shown in 
Table 3 and Table 4. 
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For mid-level democracy the first counterwave featured a range of initial polity 
drops from that ranged from a 3 point one year drop in Portugal (Portugal went on to 
drop another 12 points subsequently) to a 16 point initial drop in Latvia. This gave the 
first counterwave the distinction of a higher level of mean change in a one year time 
frame, while the second counterwave and those failures occurring outside the 
counterwaves have very similar mean polity changes in the first year that the failure 
threshold is reached. We find the opposite for low level democracies. For them, the 
second counterwave meant the steeper average initial polity drop. Of significance, 
however, is that for both types of dissonant democratic failure the average initial change 
in polity was steeper within the counterwaves than it was outside of them. 
When one moves, however, to examining the average change in polity when the 
peak failure is reached, for mid-level democratic failure the counterwaves emerge as 
being quite similar, while remaining distinct from the failures that occur outside the 
counterwaves. This phenomenon is illustrated in Table 5 and Table 6. Both 
counterwaves feature deepening failures. Not only do they go deeper, they go deeper into 
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the autocratic side by a drop of nearly 3 polity points, a drop that is the initial threshold 
for failure. This is significant. There is a less significant deepening with low level 
democratic failures. For the first counterwave, they average another 2 point drop, while 
deepening only slightly for the second counterwave. Meanwhile, low level democratic 
failures outside the counterwaves deepen the most dramatically. This is in keeping with 
our finding that those democratic failures tend to occur over a longer time span. 


















Outcomes and recovery 
Having taken a look at the average change in polity for dissonant democratic 
failures, it is interesting to compare the counterwaves in terms of those that never recover 
the level of democracy experienced before their failure. 
For mid-level failures, as shown in Graph 7, the first counterwave is again quite 
distinctive. Only one nation state didn't recover its peak level of democracy and that is a 
special case scenario since the nation state, Czechoslovakia, went out of existence. 
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enjoyed before its 1939 demise, but the 2 separate countries of the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia now both have surpassed their unified predecessor's level of democracy prior to 
the failure in 1939. If most mid-level democratic failures from the first counterwave 
regained, or surpassed, their initial peak levels of democracy, this directly contrasts with 
the second counterwave. Of course, the second counterwave was more recent that the 
first, so one is tempted to explain away this phenomenon simply as a matter of different 
amounts of time that have elapsed. After all, mid-level democratic failures haven't had 
the same number of years to recover their peak level of democracy as those that failed in 
counterwave 1. 
However, we see a stark contrast to low level democracies. While a higher 
percentage of CW1 low democratic failures did not recover peak level of democracy, a 
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scant 7% of CW2 low democratic failures don't recover peak democracy, in spite of the 
fact that the second counterwave is more recent. While the difference between mid-level 
and low level democratic failures in the first counterwave is slight, the difference 
between these subsets in the second counterwave is dramatic. By way of comparison, it 
is also interesting to note the difference in recovery rate of peak democracy between 
those outside the counterwaves in mid-level and low level democratic failures. Twice as 
many mid-level democracies fail to recover peak democracy by 2006 than low level 
democracies. While we should be careful of pushing these numbers too far in anything 
but comparison between the 2 groups,13 it is noteworthy that twice as many mid-level 
democracies failed to recover peak level democracy as low level democracy failures. 
What are the implications of these findings? On the one hand, it seems to 
reinforce the distinctive nature of each counterwave. They impacted different segments 
of democracy differently, with varying long term effects. One might easily postulate that 
low level democracy has a higher recovery rate of peak level democracy precisely 
because the bar is lower. Mid-level democracy, however, when it experiences failure has 
a longer way to climb back. This is perfectly true, and yet is interesting in its own right. 
It would seem, by this rationale, that previous experience with mid-level democracy does 
not inherently predispose a return to the status quo ante of peak democracy level prior to 
failure. 
When looking at those who experienced democratic failure using the slightly 
more lenient lens of looking at their recovery of any level of democracy, that is a polity 
score of one or higher, we find that there are still nearly 30% of mid-level failures that 
13
 It would, after all, be like comparing apples and oranges to infer recovery rate comparisons between the 
counterwaves and the outside, since the outside failures could have occurred as late as 2006. 
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never edge back into any form of democracy by 2006, in direct contrast to the first 
counterwave. For low level democratic failure, we find very low percentages of low 
level democracies with no recovery of democracy. 
This leads us to look at the average recovery time for both peak democracy, and 
any level of democracy for dissonant democracies that have experienced both failure and 
recovery. As has already been discussed, there is very little difference in mid-level and 
low level democracy when it comes to recovery of peak democracy and recovery of any 
level of democracy. Those who recovered democracy, tended to do so dramatically, not 
gradually. 
The time span for recovery is remarkably similar, as can be seen in Graph 8. It is 
interesting to note that the 14 cases of dissonant democratic failure that took place outside 
the counterwave were able to recover some level of democracy in only 11 years, while it 
took an average of 36 years for the members of the first counterwave to do the same. The 
clustering of the recoveries points to some important differences in the world system that 
have taken place across time in regards to the fostering of the democratic ideal. The 
counterwaves have been impacted by the waves of democracy, suggesting a relationship 
that would bear future investigation. Democratic failure did not subsist at low levels 
sporadically across time, but was clustered in counterwaves. Similarly, recovery of 
democracy happened at the same time that democracy was first adopted by nations for the 
first time. This suggests a collective rise and fall of the democratic ideal that argues 
strongly for an international component for both democratic failure and democratic 
success, as is shown in this case by the recovery pattern of dissonant democracy. 
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Graph 8. Dissonant democracy's recovery of peak democracy versus any democracy. 
Distinct mechanisms of failure 
How do dissonant democracies fail? There are 4 basic options. Dissonant 
democracy fails, most frequently, via coups as shown by Graph 9 and Graph 10. The 
second biggest culprit is repression by the government, as it takes away democratic 
governance. A third, but less prevalent, option is takeover by an external force. Fourth, a 
country can devolve into civil war, in a way that renders democratic governance 
impossible as factions resort to bullets not ballots in their quest for power. While the 
mechanism of failure should not be equated with a causal pathway, it does provide 
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Graph 9. Mechanism of failure for mid-level democratic failures by time period. 
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Graph 10. Mechanism of failure for low level democratic failure by time period. 
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While coups represent the most common mechanism for undermining dissonant 
democracy, the extent to which this mechanism was used in the second counterwave, 
especially in mid-level democratic failures, points to some important distinctions for that 
time of history. In looking again at Graph 9 and Graph 10, it is evident that external 
takeovers are not a dominant mechanism of failure for dissonant democracy. This 
mechanism has its largest role in the first counterwave with mid-level democracies, while 
repression has its highest showing in the first counterwave for low level democratic 
failures. Revisiting the historical context bring some of these distinctive into broader 
relief. 
The first counterwave occurred in the build up to World War II, the competing 
ideologies of fascism and communism exerted powerful antidemocratic force across the 
international system. Democracy seemed a dangerous undertaking, in many countries 
because it was feared a malleable tool for communism. During this time, as well, the 
realities of modernity and emerging nationalisms had great impact. 
The second counterwave is inextricably linked with decolonization. In the 
aftermath of colonialism, identities that had been tacked on to unify nations under 
colonial rule disappeared. Traditions, oftentimes those that had been overtly oppressed, 
re-emerged as the question of identity again emerged. In the 1800s many were forced 
into the imposed identity of nationalism. After World War II, the imposition 
disintegrated. The remnants of the colonizers institutions were there, and were often 
times quite attractive, but the desire to own the government for oneself was there on the 
part of the national governments. What arose was a lack of consensus. The colonizers 
had cobbled together people who oftentimes had no shared identity. These cobbled 
together pieces of nations had much work to do after gaining their independence.. .and 
the lack of consensus often led to the threat of anarchy, as the constructed nation states 
seemed to ready to break apart. 
In other cases, the threat of anarchy brought about military intervention. While in 
a democracy the voters and the legislative branch of government are responsible for 
problem-solving in times of crisis, in these dissonant democracies the consensus was 
simply not there. This lack of consensus is a real difficulty for emerging democracies. 
The inability to build consensus multiplies the difficulty of the scenarios and situations. 
In the absence of this consensus, military "caretakers" often stepped in to provide a 
paternalistic guardianship of the nation state as a whole, purportedly creating the space in 
which democracy could breathe and grow. There are multiple difficulties with this 
mentality, but chief among them is that democracy can then get no practice at problem 
solving when the going gets really tough. Democracy, then, remains viable in the calm, 
but not in the storm. When economic downturns loom on the horizon, the military steps 
in. When social disorder threatens the fabric of the society, the military steps in. 
Democracy remains a child in the background who can only come out to play in sunny 
weather, with no chance to face stormy weather. 
It is no coincidence that dissonant democracies face the most challenges as far as 
crisis management is concerned.14 The challenges faced in the multiple arenas of 
economic difficulty, national identity, factionalized political processes, need advanced 
help.. .but the countries that experience these challenges are the very ones that don't have 
the means to deal with them. And so, they vacillate back and forth, dabbling in 
14
 William Case, "Can the "Halfway House" Stand? Semidemocracy and Elite Theory in Three Southeast 
Asian Countries," Comparative Politics 28, no. 4 (July 1996): 437-464. 
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democracy and then switching to authoritarianism, but never experiencing the stability 
that is so needed to get them through to the other side. 
The Durability and Stability of Dissonant Democracy 
There is a difference between stability and durability. Stability references the 
status quo, a lack of change. For the purposes of this study, durability looks at length of 
time spent within a category of democracy and is thus slightly more variable, since it 
accepts some vacillation within a narrow range. Of course, these 2 concepts are linked. 
When we mention one we think of the other, but this distinction remains an important one 
to keep in mind as we look at the durability of dissonant democracy. 
Durability of dissonant democracy 
As is the case in several of the other categories, there are some important 
differences in the durability of low level and mid-level democracies. For both types of 
dissonant democracy, I examined those that had a duration of 15 years or longer. 
For low level democracy, 27 nations experienced low level democracy for 15 
years or longer. The longest running low level democracy was nineteenth century Korea, 
which existed as a low level democracy for 110 years until annexed by Japan in 1910. In 
this case, the independence of the yangban class as it interacted with a comparatively 
weak and constrained emperor, ensured the viability of this system for years. 
While the Korean case is rather unique, other nations also experienced low level 
democracy for significant periods of time, in a range of 16 to 79 years. Why, then, does 
15
 For a complete description of the interactions between the emperor and the yangban class see Hyegyong, 
The Memoirs of Lady Hyegyong, ed. and trans. JaHyun Kim Haboush (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1996). 
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low level democracy have such a reputation for a lack of longevity? Well, of the 27 
nations that experienced durability as low level democracies, only 3 had start years after 
1945. In fact, of all the long running low level democracies, only one is extant today.16 
Of the rest of the durable low level democracies, 17 had their start dates in the 1800s. In 
fact, when looking at the durability of low level democracies, it is clear to see that low 
level democracy was much more viable before 1950 than it was after. 
This is further evidence of the changing power of the democratic ideal. It is no 
longer enough to subsist at low level democracy. In fact low level democracy in recent 
years may know just enough to be dangerous. Like an ill-fated character, low level 
democracy knows enough to identify itself as liberating or somewhat democratic, but not 
enough to help it escape its situation. It may indeed suffer from raising expectations 
while failing to deliver. 
Do the durable mid-level democracies follow the same track as low level ones? Is 
this kind of dissonant democracy also a remnant of the 1800s that no longer exists in any 
great force today? When making the jump up to mid-level democracy, we find more to 
contrast than to compare with low level democracy. They share similarities in incidence 
(102 incidences of low level democracy across time as compared to 117 incidences of 
mid-level democracy across time), and nearly the same number have endured for 15 years 
or more (27 low level democracies and 25 mid-level democracies). But here the 
similarities end. This is particularly true when comparing the subset of durable low and 
mid-level democracies. 
16This case is Malaysia, with its start year of 1969. Malaysia started as a level lOdemocracy following 
independence, and has managed to hang on to at least a low level of democracy "against all odds" so to 
speak. This may have quite a bit to do with its highly institutionalized democratic framework at 
independence. 
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While durable low level democracy belongs largely to the confines of the 1800s 
and early 1900s, durable mid-level democracy occurs more predominantly after 1945. In 
fact, while only 1 durable low level democracy was still extant at the end of the time 
under study, 8 of the 25 durable mid level democracies still existed in 2006. Mid-level 
democracy, along with high level democracy, has increased as a percentage of the 
international system, while low level democracy was almost extinct in 2006. 
Downward mobility within the broader context 
When talking about stability within a polity we really are most concerned with 
negative change. And, of course, it is more alarming (and less stable), when these 
negative changes are extreme. Are we really alarmed when an autocracy or lower level 
democracy precipitously changes into a high level democracy? No. Our only real 
concern when this occurs is whether an adequate foundation exists on which to build to 
prevent an equally wild downward swing. 
What is the pathway for dissonant democratic failures, as situated within the 
broader context of dissonant democracy? To get at this question, let's look at the 
outcomes for mid-level and low level democracies. Falsely creating 2006 as the "end of 
history" allows us to get some idea of dissonant democracy's function in the international 
system, especially in comparison with high level democracy. Is low level democracy 
mainly a bridge to high level democracy? Is it a playground for liberating autocracies 
that then sink back into old habits? Or, perhaps we can think of dissonant democracy as a 
sort of institutional learning center, where nation states enter the doors, before retreating 
back into autocracy, but will debut at a higher level if they attempt democracy again? 
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Of the nation states that have experienced low level democracy at some point 
within the time frame of this study (1800-2006), 31 have risen out of low level 
democracy to at least a temporarily higher state, while 61 have fallen back down into 
autocracy from low level democracy. Two nations went out of existence from low level 
democracy (Orange Free State and the United Provinces) and 8 nation states were low 
level democracies as of 2006. So, of the 102 nation states that have been, at least at some 
point, low level democracies, 60% have decreased into autocracy. 
What about the next tier of dissonant democracies? How do mid-level 
democracies fare across time? One of the clearest divergences is in the fact that 32 nation 
states still exist as mid-level democracies, compared to only 8 of the low level 
democracies which can make this boast. This is of particular interest, since the 2 
categories have similar numbers of constituents (102 for low level democracy and 117 for 
mid-level democracy). As far as splitting those that have decreased in polity, 44% have 
experienced negative change while roughly 30% have experienced positive change. The 
remaining 27% are those nation states that remained mid-level democracies in 2006. 
Having looked at the durability for dissonant democracy, the time has come to 
compare this category with high level democracy. Since there is no higher category, no 
one can move up, but what happens to those who exist in this highest strata? This 
category of democracy had the most constituents of any type of democracy at the end of 
2006, with 71 constituent nation states. There are 121 nation states that have experienced 
high level democracy at some point in the course of the study. Of these 121 political 
entities, 48 experienced enough of a downward swing as to no longer be a high level 
democracy. In addition, 2 states went out of existence, West Germany and 
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Czechoslovakia. We might say, however, that they've balanced each other out since 
West Germany assimilated the East Germans into high level democracy and both 
constituent nations of the former Czechoslovakia also exist as high level democracies. 
High level democracy, then, has proven the most durable of the types of democracy. This 
leaves us with further questions about dissonant democracy as a transitory state. 
In order to more fully explore the question of dissonant democracy as a transitory 
state, we can work backward from those who have achieved high level democracy, to see 
what function the lower levels played in their journeys. Of the 71 nation states that were 
high level democracies at the end of this study's timeline in 2006, 42 had been high level 
democracies for at least 15 years. In one sense, requiring these democracies to be present 
in 2006 is a rather low bar, since, as we have seen, high level democracy is the most 
prevalent form of democracy in 2006. In another sense, however, it seems only fair to 
compare the democratization trajectories of these current, high level democracies with 
durations of at least 15 years, with the trajectories of high level democratic failures. 
There are several basic trajectories of "modern" persistent high level democracies, 
namely those that meet the requirement above. Their transition patterns were not at all 
what one might anticipate based on the transition literature.17 One might expect that 
nation states start out as autocracies, make some reforms, proceed to low level 
democracy, make some reforms, proceed to mid-level democracy, make some reforms, 
and then finally arrive at high level democracy, via a nice and stable process of gradual 
reform. In the entire dataset of those high level democracies that are both extant in 2006, 
and have been high level democracies for at least 15 years, only 2 nation states took this 
17
 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1960). 
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route. Only Costa Rica and the United Kingdom started off as autocracies, then moved to 
low level democracy, before passing on to mid-level, and finally high level democracy. 
The rest fall into 3 basic categories, which each deviate quite substantially from 
this expected outcome. In one group, we have the subset of somewhat gradual transition. 
In order to belong to this category, the nation state must have been either a mid-level or 
low level democracy for at least one year before transitioning to high level democracy. 
Of the 42 nations studied, 14 (including Costa Rica and the UK) meet this requirement, 
with 5 nations spending time as low level democracies prior to their transition and 7 
nations spending time as mid-level democracies prior to their transition. The majority, 
however, fall outside this category. These nations either debut as high level democracies 
(the case for 7 of them), or transition to high level democracy directly from autocracy. 
Interestingly, autocracy is a more likely springboard for high level democracy than either 
low level democracy or mid-level democracy or even than both types of dissonant 
democracy combined. What might our conclusions imply for those nation states that are 
currently either mid-level or low level democracies? 
Before we jump to the conclusion that dissonant democracies are bereft of value, 
let us look at the role they have played in democracies that have failed more than once. 
In doing so, perhaps we will discover a constructive purpose, not only for dissonant 
democracy, but also for the role of democratic failure. 
Repeat Offenders 
One indicator of instability is the issue of repeat offenders, those nation states that 
have experienced democratic failure more than one time. This indicates both a repeated 
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attempt to try democracy once it has failed, and a repeat failure of democracy the second 
time. One question that might arise is to distinguish between outcomes for those who 
failed only once and the repeat offenders. Let's take a couple minutes to look at this 
issue. The results for those nations that did not repeat democratic failure are quite mixed. 
A majority of the countries did not repeat democratic failure because they never 
recovered any form of democracy. For those that did recover democracy, Albania and 
Armenia recovered mid-level democracy but did not manage progress to high level 
democracy. That leaves only 3 success stories: Brazil, Germany and Latvia. 
The vast majority of nations in this study failed at least twice, whether as a mid-
level democracy, a low level democracy, a high level democracy or one of each. In 
addition, several of these nations experienced a deepening in autocracy during their 
history before they ever instituted democracy. This means that their polity score 
worsened by at least a 3 point drop at some point as an autocracy. It is interesting to note 
that the nations that experienced deepening autocracy often went on to experience 
democratic failure, a subject that will be examined in greater detail in the following 
chapter. 
Dissonant democratic failure has a very high percentage of repeat offenders, as 
shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Of the entire subset of low level democracies, those 
experiencing only one failure comprise 35% of the entire data set. If we look into this 
further, we see that 8 of those that only experience 1 failure fall into autocracy, but don't 
re-emerge from it, so democratic failure is obviously not an option for them. 
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Figure 6. Mid-level democratic failures by number of times failed. 
Figure 7. Low level democratic failures by number of times failed. 
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That leaves us with only 19% that experience democratic failure only once. For 
the entire dataset, including these who fail only once, the mean number of failures is 
2.21. 
Conclusion 
Dissonant democracy, in many ways, continues the discovery process started in 
the previous chapter. Like high level democratic failures, mid-level and low level 
democracies are disproportionately represented within the counterwave time bands. 
Dissonant democracy also tends to fail quickly. 
Dissonant democratic failure also further illuminates the distinctions between the 
2 counterwave phenomena. These lower levels of democracy figured more prominently 
in the second downturn than in the first. Dissonant democracies also feature many repeat 
offenders, demonstrating the impact of mid-level and low level democracy on both 
durability and stability. It now remains to study the deepening of autocracy, to see 





In 1973 Juan Linz published a book entitled Totalitarian and Authoritarian 
Regimes. At the time, it seemed clear that this topic was one of importance since "at least 
half of humanity" lived under the influence of non-democracy. Whether totalitarian, 
authoritarian or sultanistic, all of the regimes included in the Linz study easily qualified 
as nondemocracies. During the time, studying autocracy seemed a good bread and butter 
undertaking for a scholar, an endeavor with strong possibilities for a steady stream of 
future publications. Linz used the following quote by Robert Dahl to summarize 
scholars' expectations for change in the coming decades: "As with a great many things, 
the safest bet about a country's regime a generation from now is that it will be somewhat 
different but not radically different from what it is today."2 The expectation was for a 
continuation of the same. In this case, the strength of non-democracy seemed sure, while 
the advance of democracy was not to be contemplated. One could equate the perceived 
likelihood of democratic advance to a swift conclusion to conflict in the midst of trench 
warfare. 
Although non-democracy seemed completely "dug in" in 1973, a scant 3 years 
hence the third wave of democratization launched from the Iberian Peninsula, and 
dramatically changed the landscape of polities. In the updated introduction to the 2000 
edition of his book, Linz admits "I certainly was wrong in my pessimism about the 
1
 Juan Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2000), 56. 
2
 Ibid., 269. 
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possibility of peaceful, orderly, even formally constitutional transition from 
nondemocratic regimes to democracy."3 
Given this seismic shift, then, should we study autocracies? Isn't this particularly 
incongruent in a study on democratic failure? Autocracies, by definition, exclude the 
possibility of democratic failure. At first glance, a chapter on autocracy seems an 
unwelcome stranger in a study of democratic failure. 
One justification for its inclusion is the literature on the legacy of an autocratic 
history on the quality of democracy post-transition. This view argues that autocracies 
leave an indelible stamp. 
Lingering authoritarian legacies—even when they cannot per se cause 
authoritarian backlash—nevertheless present a long-term problem for the 
quality and consistency of postauthoritarian democratic regimes, both at 
the macrolevel of political and economic institutions' operations and at the 
microlevel of citizens' perceptions of democracy. 
Adding to this literature is a separate one tying centralized autocracy to state 
collapse. By this reasoning, the nation state's unique projection of power into every 
aspect of civilian life, replacing the institutions of civil society, makes it more fragile in 
its rigidity. When it fails, the state falls apart completely.5 Failed states, particularly in 
the post 9/11 atmosphere, garner enough attention to merit further study of autocracy. 
In addition to these arguments for the importance of studying autocracy is the 
knowledge that while autocracies can't be democratic failures, they can deepen. This 
chapter takes a look at the deepening of autocracy, and relates it to our study of 
3
 Juan Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2000), 33. 
4
 Katherine Hite and Paola Cesarini, Authoritarian Legacies and Democracy in Latin America and 
Southern Europe (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), 5. 
5 1 . William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 7. 
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Figure 8. Nations experiencing autocratic deepening. 
democratic failure. After all, autocracy was the predominant form of governance 
globally, although in varying concentrations, for the first 100 years of the time under 
study. What we have done thus far for democracy, looking at the various levels of 
democracy and examining democratic failure in light of these considerations, we will 
now do for autocracy. Constraints on space necessitate brevity so our focus primarily 
rests on describing autocracy and how it has changed and evolved over the time under 
study, the status of autocracy as it existed in the counterwave time period, and, finally, 
the durability and stability of autocracy. Each of these sections, additionally, offers the 
ability to compare and contrast the state of autocracy with the state of democracy that has 
already been discussed. After all, as we can see from Figure 8, autocratic deepening has 
been just as global a phenomenon as democratic failure, and has also been toxic to the 
democratic ideal. 
Perfect Autocracies 
What do the institutions of a nation with a -10 score look like? "In mature form, 
autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief 
executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and 
once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints."7 Thus, mature 
democracies and mature autocracies are diametrically opposed. 
When I look at autocracy, here's the logic to which I easily tend. Democracy is 
good. A level 10 democracy is the most well-consolidated democracy. Therefore, a 
level 10 is the best government. Autocracy is bad. A -10 is the most well-consolidated 
autocracy. Therefore, a -10 is the worst government. 
Given this mindset, when I look at Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Soviet Union or 
even at Kim's North Korea I expect to see perfect -10 regimes.. .after all, aren't these 
good historic examples of complete autocracy? And yet all these regimes missed the 
"perfect autocracy" designation by a point weighing in at -9. Polity doesn't code these as 
perfect autocracies, because while authority has been vested in one person, that one 
person was supported by an elite group, usually well-organized within a party structure. 
In fact, it is interesting to note that the regimes most often thought of as completely 
totalitarian, the perpetrators of some of the most stunning crimes against humanity, have 
what we might call "managed" autocracy. The fact that the bloodiest, most ruthless 
despots of the twentieth century in fact used a party structure to disperse their cruelty 
merely reinforces the power that underlies institutionalized government. The 
organizational advances that facilitate democratic governance of the nation state brings 
7
 Polity IV Project: Dataset Users' Manual, 14. 
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structure and efficiency to governmental rule can be used to structure tax programs, or to 
structure the dissemination of Jews to death camps.8 
Polity doesn't measure evil. Polity does measure institutionalized value structures 
as related to the concentration of power. In democracies, there are more hands in the 
power pie. This is not to say the nation state itself is less powerful. In fact, the reach of 
the state in mature democracies is often quite extensive (directing and controlling large 
sectors of the economy and society), but the power institutions themselves have more 
voices and these voices compete before a constituency. In complete autocracies, the 
voice more closely approximates a monotone. 
To give us a better idea of the scope encompassed by autocracy, let's look at some 
of the generalities. As seen in Graph 11, while no nation entered the dataset in 1800 as a 
perfect democracy, twelve nation states entered the data set as perfect autocracies. The 
1800s saw the birth of 7 additional perfect autocracies between the years of 1806-1816, 
but all 7 of these nations went out of existence well before 1900. The 1900s birthed 18 
more perfect autocracies. 
While 12 nations entered the data set as perfect autocracies, only 2 perfect 
autocracies, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, remained in 2006. Perfect autocracy is rarer at the 
end of the dataset than it was at the beginning. In some sense, we might consider the fate 
of these perfect autocracies as an ideal testing ground for the varying penetration and 
power of the democratic ideal. Table 7 shows the varying 2006 outcomes for those 
nation states that have at one time or another experienced ideal autocracies. While this is 
clearly a mixed bag, but it is interesting to note that only 34% of those who have 
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Graph 11. Number of perfect autocracies, 1800-2006. 
experienced perfect autocracy remain at any level of autocracy in 2006. This certainly 
















































But what of the rest of the scope of autocracy? If democracy in 2006 can 
encompass such disparate nations as Canada and Cambodia, Spain and Sierra Leone, it 
might serve us well to examine the varying levels of autocracy. We've already looked at 
"perfect" autocracy, but what does autocracy look like across the range from -10 to 0? 
What do the various levels of autocracy look like? 
General Considerations 
There is a great temptation, still present today, to view autocracy in a monolithic 
way. This temptation is particularly strong in macro studies which, like this one, lump. 
Lumping studies look at big picture trends, while ignoring some of the finer grain 
distinctions. These macro observations bring both reward and peril, and have sometimes 
been rightly critiqued for simply muddying the water, instead of bringing clarity. 
To combat this, finer grain distinctions are in order, even when they are 
necessarily still broad in scope. Linz in his seminal work on autocratic regimes, created 
broad typologies based on his perception of regime characteristics. This is entirely 
plausible and beneficial. Totalitarian regimes differ from authoritarian ones by the extent 
to which they "completely organize political life and society" often while using terror and 
ideology as weapons of choice.9 In turn, sultanistic regimes, those non-democratic 
regimes that root their legitimacy in traditional monarchy, are also distinct. And, both of 
these entities are different from Linz's definition of an authoritarian regime, which still 
maintains a distinction between the government and society.10 
9
 Juan Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2000), 4. 
10
 Ibid., 10. 
Since the focus of this study is on institutionalized power structures, I have 
chosen different distinctions, based on the presence and absence of institutional 
characteristics, as evidenced in the polity scores. In the division of the polity scale, those 
nation states with a polity score of 0 to -10 qualify as autocracies. Within this category, 
however, are 3 subcategories. As with democracies, the categories are: low level 
autocracy (0 to -3), mid level autocracy (-4 to -7), and high level autocracy (-8 to -10). 
Creating the same categories for autocracy that we have created for democracy 
helps to determine if there are certain thresholds for an autocracy's durability and 
stability. While it would be unwieldy to discuss all the autocracies that have existed 
across the data set, looking at a couple examples provides a mooring. 
Without surprise, Singapore is classified as a low level autocracy. Defying all 
who link a high standard of living inextricably with high level democracy, the prosperous 
autocrats of this city-state have maintained the status quo as a low level autocracy ever 
since the move away from mid-level democracy in 1965. The country of Jordan is 
another contemporary example of a low level autocracy. The voice of moderation in a 
rather prickly neighborhood, Jordan has moderated the higher levels of autocracy of past 
years and now keeps autocracy to a fairly low thrum. 
Mid-level autocracy is another slice. From 1952-2004, Egypt was a mid-level 
autocracy, although it has since moderated to a low level one for the final 2 years under 
study. Cuba, too, is an example of a mid-level autocracy. In the years that immediately 
followed the revolution, it was a high level autocracy, but by 1961 it had settled into a 
durable mid-level autocratic state. 
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High level autocracy is the last subdivision of autocracy. Perfect autocracy has 
already been discussed. The other members of this group are those nation states score -8 
or -9. Stalin's Russia, and Hitler's Germany have already been mentioned as members of 
the high autocracy club. Vichy France and Mussolini's Italy also qualify. In 2006, 9 
nations made up this diminishing group.11 Five of these nations have been high level 
autocracies since inception, and 2 have always been -10 autocracies. These regimes, 
whether sultanistic, highly authoritarian or totalitarian, all share similar institutional 
power structures. 
Just as democracies have fluctuated between different kinds of democracy, 
autocracies fluctuate between the varying levels of autocracy. This variance will be 
discussed in greater detail in the section of autocracy's durability, but I wanted to 
mention it here to guard against the idea of a monolithic, static "state of being" type of 
mindset. The subdivisions between the varying types of autocracy are helpful, but they 
are also fluid. 
One of the goals of the study is to look at the varying levels of autocracy to 
discover the ways autocracy has changed across time in relation to democracy. Before 
looking the evidence as gathered, let's talk about some reasonable scenarios. First of all, 
autocracy could retreat when democracy is on the march. In the same way, we might 
expect that when autocracy is on the march, democracy retreats in a "tit for tat" scenario. 
Another scenario we might call polarization. When democracies get more democratic, 
autocracies in turn get more autocratic. Or, in a third scenario, there might be no 
discernible relationship between democracy and autocracy. They may just coexist with 
11
 These nations are: Bhutan, North Korea, Myanmar (Burma), Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
no relationship at all. These are 3 options to keep in mind as we explore autocratic 
deepening, and possible relationships with democracy and democratic failure. 
Autocracy as ideology 
While democracy has a clear ideological component, the case of linking ideology 
and autocracy is at times a bit murky. This is due, in part, to the broader variation in 
arrangements of governance that live under the autocratic canopy. Present in autocracy's 
tent is communism, fascism, totalitarianism, sultanism, military dictatorship and even 
other subtypes. The ideology behind autocracy has a much broader field to cover, as we 
can see from this list. Perhaps this is the reason autocracy is sometimes viewed as less 
ideological in nature. 
Instead of being less ideological in nature, autocracy simply has a more varied 
ideological background. For the purposes of this study, the 2 main variants have been 
communism and fascism. These 2 systems of government have been diametrically 
opposed to democracy, offering alternate visions of how to govern wisely and in the 
name of the people, while not advocating specific governance for the people. Both of 
these systems have exhibited extreme fervor in their ideological components. Karl 
Loewenstein, writing in 1935, aptly described the messianic fervor of both systems of 
thought: 
We are therefore on safe ground in assuming that modern dictatorships of 
fascist or communist tinge are not only articles for home consumption but 
religious, which, like all great spiritual movements of history, aspire to 
transform the whole world gradually into one realm of autocratic rule; 
while the suppression of democracy by autocracy will be but a means of 
the transformation of the spiritual, political, and economic system of the 
globe.12 
12
 Karl Loewenstein, "Autocracy Versus Democracy in Contemporary Europe I," The American Political 
Science Review 29, no. 4 (August 1935): 574. 
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Both systems of thought provided answers to the problems facing countries under 
more democratic governance. In cases where the distribution of wealth was stilted away 
from workers and toward owners communism offered a strongly ideological answer to 
this thorny problem. 
The Soviet Union became the consummate example of union of communism and 
the state. As Robert Wesson has stated, writing at a time when the Soviet Union was still 
in existence: 
No society can be understood without reference to the image it draws of 
itself and its purposes; and this is emphatically true of the Soviet Union, 
which has forcefully and with extraordinary persistence asserted its 
ideological foundations and based its legitimacy upon a canon.13 
Of interesting note, when the Soviet Union crumbled, the ideology was defeated as well. 
This brings up an interesting point about the intersection of ideology and the legitimacy 
of a state as intertwined self-reinforcing mechanisms. When the ideology of the Soviet 
Union was challenged, the system crumbled as the legitimacy for rule no longer existed. 
Thoroughly discredited as an ideology, the remaining "communists" in the world are 
decidedly less committed to the foundational tenets of communism, namely a rejection of 
capitalism. It is easy to write communism off as a system of autocracy that is dead. This 
presumes, however, that it will never again rise. This is wrong-headed. Democracy will 
always face the challenge of balancing the equitable distribution of wealth with liberty 
and freedom. If she should fail to manage this balancing act, as she has failed in the past, 
I am willing to wager that some reincarnation of a tempered communist ideal will again 
surface. 
13
 Robert Wesson, "The Soviet State, Ideology, and Patterns of Autocracy," Soviet Studies 20, no. 2 
(October 1968): 179. 
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If it is broadly accepted that communism is ideological in nature, fascism's 
ideology is less clearly delineated. In contrast to democracy, fascism and communism 
are both "systems on which the survival of the individuals is guaranteed by the state."14 
Sharing several characteristics of rule in common with communism, for example the cult 
of personality of the state leader, the state's interference with the economy, and the 
inherent paternalism of the state leader as protector of the people, some have argued there 
is really little functional difference between communism and fascism. 
While this may be true in practice, the underlying justification of rule is different. 
I readily acknowledge that fascism, unlike communism and even democracy, "does not 
rest on formal philosophical positions with claims to universal validity." 5 Fascism uses 
ideas differently, and has retained validity beyond communism for precisely these 
reasons. As Robert Paxton has noted: 
There was no "Fascist Manifesto," no founding fascist thinker. Although 
one can deduce from fascist language implicit Social Darwinist 
assumptions about human nature, the need for community and authority in 
human society, and the destiny of nations in history, fascism does not base 
its claims to validity on their truth. 
Precisely because of this, fascist ideas have proven more long-lasting than their 
communist counterparts. Military dictatorships, sultanistic regimes, and other 
nationalistic regimes the world over find their roots here. Fascism is such a powerful 
ideology precisely because it is so fluid. There are no inconvertible truths that must be 
tended in order for legitimacy to reign. The underlying ideology for fascism lies in the 
14
 Alexander Krisztics, "Essential Principles of Socialism, Fascism, and Democracy," Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 180 (July 1935): 133. 
15
 Robert O. Paxton, "The Five Stages of Fascism," The Journal of Modern History 70, no. 1 (March 1998): 
4. 
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fundamental assumption that governmental leadership is better equipped to make 
decisions for the nation than the people themselves. 
Democracy is particularly vulnerable following systemic disturbances. The lead 
up to and aftermath of World War I, birthed fascism and nurtured communism, 2 
ideologies that are fundamentally opposed to the democratic ideal. Fascism, in particular, 
was birthed "not during a period of overriding growth but during one of prevailing 
economic vicissitudes."17 The future is veiled, but the lessons of the ascendance of 
autocratic ideology prove useful if democracy is to prevail. 
Democracy's Never Never Land 
In 2006, there were 29 extant nations born as autocracies that have never 
transitioned. These never democracies consist of 5 that have always been high level 
autocracies, 2 of them having always been perfect autocracies. There are an additional 17 
nation states that went out of existence that had never experienced democratic transition. 
Of the nations that no longer exist, most were incorporated into nation states that are 
currently high level democracies, with Vietnam and Yemen as the notable exceptions. 
Why should we be concerned about nations that have never experienced 
democracy? Certainly the areas that have never experienced democracy are quite 
instructive as to their resilience against the spread of democracy. In this sense, they 
represent a real challenge to the democratic ideal. Figure 9 shows the stretch of these 
never democracies. Scholars have noted the democratic ideal has not been imported by 
17
 Charles S. Maier, "Some Recent Studies of Fascism," The Journal of Modern History 48, no.3 
(September 1976): 521. 
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Figure 9. Nations never experiencing democracy. 
some nation states, and even by some geographic regions. The focus has largely been on 
Islam's resistance to democracy's forward march, the map above demonstrates its lack of 
penetration in other locales as well. Not only has antidemocracy flourished in the Middle 
East, it has continued sustenance in Africa and Asia as well. 
Autocratic Deepening 
While as a whole, autocracy experienced a decline from the height of its 
influence in 1825, both counterwaves offered times of resurgence as democracies crossed 
over into autocratic territory. The relationship between autocratic deepening and the 
counterwaves is evident in Graph 12. This trend is most clearly visible in the second 
counterwave, as our previous discussions would lead us to expect. The first counterwave 
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Graph 12. Mean polity score versus autocratic deepening. 
this clearly counted as a democratic failure, the external rule was not consolidated into 
autocratic institutions, as so counts as an interruption, a code that is not factored into the 
autocracy or democracy scores. 
While failing democracies clearly account for a portion of autocracies' advance 
during the counterwave years, there is also a relationship between the counterwaves and 
autocratic deepening. Autocracies sporadically experienced deepening in the 1850-1880 
time band, but experienced a strong peak during both counterwaves as can be seen in 
Graph 13, where the rise of all types of autocracy is evident in CW1 (1922-1940) and in 
CW2 (1957-1977). 
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Graph 14. Percentage of autocracy and democracy versus the mean polity score. 
In contrast to the first counterwave, however, the second one fed mid level 
autocracy most vigorously, a trend that decreased at the onset of the third wave of 
democracy. Toward the end of the time period studied, we see a general amelioration of 
autocracy, as low level autocracy is on the rise while mid-level and high level autocracy 
are both in decline. 
This relationship between autocratic deepening, democracy's advance and the 
counterwaves is even more compelling when looking at the average polity score in 
comparison with autocracy and democracy as percentages of the international system, as 
shown in Graph 14. The percentage of democracy in the system tracks to a stunning 
degree with the mean polity score, underlining the role of democracy's rise and fall as 
contributing to shifts in the mean polity score. We can see that, as expected, autocracy 
roughly rises in step with the counterwaves as well, even when considered as a whole. 
Furthering our examination of the relationship between autocratic deepening, 
democratic failures and the counterwaves, we see the consistent pattern of autocratic 
deepening preceding democratic failure. In other words, autocracies get worse before 
democracies fail. This relationship, shown in Graph 15, strengthens the argument that the 
study of autocratic deepenings has important implications for democratic failure. More 
research needs to be done in this area to determine the exact nature of the relationship, 
but autocratic deepening has clearly served as a bellwether for democratic failure in both 
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Graph 15. Autocratic deepening, democratic failure and the mean polity score. 
Autocracy and Durability 
Among contemporary scholars who study democracy, and in particular 
democratic transitions, it has become increasingly unpopular to extol any virtues of 
autocracy. However, if any remnant of respect for autocratic institutions remains, it is in 
the arena of stability. Autocracies, if little else in today's parlance, still retain relevance 
as stabilizers of society. When democracy gets messy and factionalized or grinds to a 
halt because of the inability to form consensus, autocracy steps in with cool assurance 
and cools, or extinguishes, flaring tempers and contention. In other words, autocracy 
knows how to do stability. 
18
 Henry Bienen and Nicolas van de Walle, "A Proportional Hazard Model of Leadership Duration," The 
Journal of Politics 54, no. 3 (August 1992): 685-717. 
The durability and stability of autocracies are 2 different things. First of all, we 
have durability. A polity can be safely understood as being an autocracy when it has a 
polity score of-10 to 0. However, we often times see "interruptions" in the autocratic 
rule, just as we have interruptions in democratic rule. These interruptions come in a 
variety of forms, as has already been discussed, but they all interrupt regularized rule. In 
no sense can we look at these interruptions as a transition to democracy. Neither, 
however, can we say that organized autocratic rule is in place. It is in this sense that 
duration and stability are separate and important concepts that help us flesh out these 
differences. In many cases where autocracy "ends" it transitions to one of the 
interruption states. While we can't refer to this as a continuance of autocracy, we can 
refer to this as a continuance of non-democracy. The bigger issue, of course, is that of 
stability. Non-democracy and autocracy have slightly different durations, but a transition 
from autocracy to one of these interruption states reflects a lack of stability. Non-
democracy is durable in certain time periods of this study, but what is its stability? In 
other words, how often is the state of autocracy interrupted? Looking at the number of 
interruptions experienced in Graph 16 and how they have contributed to autocracy's lack 
of durability, helps us to understand that autocracy is not the monolithic state of being 
that is often assumed. There are shades to autocracy just as there are shades to 
democracy. Some of these interruptions resulted in lesser autocracy, some of the 
interruptions resulted in deepened autocracy and many resulted in a continuity of the 
autocracy experienced before the interruption occurred. 
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Graph 16. Interruptions in democracy and autocracy. 
Repeat offenders for autocratic deepening 
At this point, it might serve as a good reminder to review the fact that in the larger 
polity dataset, there are 3 basic options: autocracy, democracy, and interruption. Some 
nations within the dataset started out as democracies and remained democracies for the 
length of the study. So too, some began as autocracies and remained autocracies for the 
length of the study. The vast majority experienced swings, both within democracy and 
autocracy and between the 2, often times also passing through "interruptions." 
We've already discussed repeat offenders in democratic failure. Now, we will do 













ideas about autocracy's stability and durability. Second, it offers points of comparison 
with democratic failure. 
For the autocracies, the following nation states experience repeated autocratic 
deepening: Bolivia, Bulgaria, El Salvador, Hungary, Mexico, Paraguay, Romania, 
Thailand and Turkey. Bolivia experienced a total of 4 episodes of autocratic deepening, 
while El Salvador had 3. The rest of the nations had 2 bouts of autocratic deepening. 
We might take a couple moments to note a few things about those nations that 
experienced more than one polity drop of 3 points in their autocracy score, a significant 
deepening of their autocracy on more than one occasion in their history. There are only 9 
of these nations, and all of them went on subsequently, to become some level of 
democracy by 2006. Did repeat experience with deepening autocracy predispose these 
nations to less stable democracy? Well, 4 of the nations did not experience democratic 
failure and 5 of them did experience democratic failure. This looks like a less than robust 
argument for instability on one side of the polity scale indicating instability on the other 
side of the scale. In fact, it seems an argument that some nation states are able to leave 
their past behind them when they cross over into democracy. Closer examination, as is 
frequently true, reveals a more nuanced view. The 5 nations that have experienced at 
least one democratic failure in addition to their repeated polity drops, without exception, 
all had first born democracies before or during the counterwave years. If we look at the 
duration of these first born democracies, it further emphasizes the toxicity of the 
counterwave years to democracy. Bolivia first birthed democracy in 1880. This first 
attempt lasted until 1935, being sucked under in the first counterwave. Bulgaria's 
democracy was born in 1918, just as the first counterwave was launching, and only 
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endured for a year. Paraguay's first democracy was also born during the first 
counterwave in 1937, but only lasted 3 years. Turkey first experimented with democracy 
in 1946, but experienced democratic failure during the second counterwave. Thailand's 
first attempt, during the second counterwave in 1969, only lasted 2 years before falling. 
In contrast, the 4 nations that have repeated polity drops, but have not experienced 
democratic failure, without exception, were all born after the end of the second 
counterwave. One could reasonably argue that, since these latest experiments in first 
time democracy came after the final counterwave, they have been born toward the end of 
the dataset and therefore have not had equal opportunity to fail. This is certainly true, but 
it should be pointed out that, with the exception of Bolivia (born well before the first 
counterwave in 1880, and succumbing to it after a duration of 56 years as a democracy), 
all the other countries' first attempts at democracy lasted between 1 and 8 years. Even 
with the very newest first born democracy with no democratic failure experience, a time 
span of 16 years has passed between the onset of democracy and the end of the study. 
The evidence, therefore, seems to point more in the direction of the toxicity of the 
counterwaves. 
Repeated experiences with autocracy 
While repeated autocratic polity drops are one way to measure instability on the 
autocratic side is to look at the number of countries that have only experienced autocracy 
for once in their history. Out of the 149 nation states that have, at one time or another, 
been autocracies, we find 73 experience autocracy only once. Of these, 28 were still 
autocracies at the end of the study and another 13 were countries that had gone out of 
existence. The remaining nations transitioned from autocracy to democracy, and while 
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they might have experienced variance in the degree of autocracy or the degree of 
democracy, they did not cross the border back into autocracy after their democratization. 
In terms of stability, it might also be interesting to note that of the 73 nation states that 
only experienced autocracy one time, 56 experienced autocracy for more than 15 years. 
Autocratic deepening and democratic failure 
We've already examined the relationship between repeat polity drops and 
democratic failure, but what of those nations that only experienced autocratic deepening 
once. Is there any evidence linking autocratic deepening and democratic failure? 
In fact, we find a very high number of nation states that have experienced polity 
drops as autocracies also experience democratic failure. This, of course, presumes a 
transition to democracy. Of the 52 nations that have experienced polity drop, 16 
experienced democratic failure because they never transitioned to democracy. 
The remaining 36 nations did make the transition to democracy. Of these, only 10 
have no experience with democratic failure. When we look at these 10 democracies, with 
a history of polity drop but with no history of subsequent democratic failure, we find that 
9 out of 10 of these democracies were born after the end of the second counterwave. The 
most mature of this group is El Salvador, born in 1984, while the youngest is Burundi's 
dissonant democracy, born in 2005. It remains to be seen, whether the lack of democratic 
failure in these newer democracies is due to core differences in democracies born after 
the counterwaves, versus the democratic path traveled by those pre-counterwave or 
whether, in the more pessimistic view, these democracies have not yet existed long 
enough to face the challenges that will bring about their downfall. 
What, then, is the impact of a history of autocratic deepening upon democracies? 
Should we assume that the experience of a polity drop while an autocracy deepens the 
autocratic legacy when a nation transitions to democracy? For this to be the case, we 
would expect to find the polity drops occurring first, then a nation's experience with 
democratic failure. If we further examine the subset of nations that have experienced 
both autocratic and democratic polity drops, we see that this is the case only some of the 
time. In fact, 8 of the 26 nations first experienced democratic failure and then 
experienced a polity drop as an autocracy.19 If anything, these cases seem to indicate a 
continued legacy for democratic failure, as injurious to the nation state. Or, one might 
simply conclude that the polity is equally prone to instability as an autocracy and a 
democracy. In this case, however, one would expect to see more equal numbers between 
autocratic polity drops and democratic failures.. .assuming the time spent at each was 
roughly equivalent. Instead, we do not observe this to be true. What then can we take 
away from this endeavor? 
We can't derive from this that autocratic polity drop is the precursor of 
democratic failure. While it highly correlated with the experience of democratic failure, 
there are many democratic failures that have no polity drops in their history. By contrast, 
as we have seen there are few nations that experience polity drop, but escape democratic 
failure, especially if the democracy was born before 1977. 
19
 It is good to bear in mind that democratic failure and autocratic deepening are different phenomenon. 
For example, if a democracy has a polity score of 6, then the following year dips to 0, and then down to -6, 
this is only recorded as a deepening of the democratic failure, and not as an occurrence of autocratic 
deepening. 
143 
Democratic failure and repeated autocratic deepening 
Are democratic repeat offenders comprised mostly of those that have experienced 
at least one polity drop? Of the 34 nations that have repeatedly failed at democracy, only 
29% have experienced an autocratic polity drop. We might also ask how many of the 
repeat offenders within the autocratic polity drop camp have then experienced 
democratic failure, an extremely fair question since all of the repeat autocratic deepening 
camp had experienced democracy by 2006? Five of the 9 nations that experienced 
multiple autocratic polity drops also experienced democratic failure, although only 2 
nations, Turkey and Thailand, have the distinction of being repeat offenders for both 
autocratic polity drop and democratic failure. 
Conclusion 
What can we take away from our study of autocratic deepening? First of all, we 
know that autocracies get worse in a disproportionate way, during the counterwaves. 
This forwards our argument of the wide impact of the counterwaves, both geographically 
and in terms of polity type. The subtypes of autocracy have fluctuated across time. We 
also have discovered that autocratic deepening is more likely to take more than a year, as 
opposed to the shorter failure times for democracies. In addition, we have shown that 
autocracy, as a whole, has experienced more incidences of instability than has 
democracy. This holds true even when we account for autocracy's sway on the world for 
much of the nineteenth century. The broad shifts that have occurred in autocracy point to 
the larger picture of change in the international system and are a perfect segue into our 
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concluding chapter, where we will recap the main findings of our study in a comparative 
manner, while tying them to the ideas that form their roots. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The move to modernity inexorably linked new ideas and governance. With the 
onset of modernity, the days when bloodlines determined capacity to rule were limited. 
A fundamental paradigm shift in the ideas of legitimacy reigned. This post-
Enlightenment move away from fundamental assumptions about the working of the 
universe carved a great divide in history. On the other side of this chasm, democracy and 
antidemocracy were both alive and well. Democracy approached the problem of how to 
replace the divine by locating it fundamentally in all people. The rule of the many, the 
downtrodden idea across previous centuries, began an inexorable ascendance. 
Institutions had evolved to mitigate democracy's failings. Legislatures were elected, 
giving the masses a voice in rule without involving them in the daily particulars. 
Regularized elections cycles, rights for the opposition, freedom of expression and 
constraints upon authority all served to tame democracy's "capricious" nature, making 
democracy safe for the world and ensuring a departure from mob rule. Rule by the many 
is undergirded by fundamental assumptions of the equality of men. Democracy, in 
moving away from the divine right of kings, crowned every person a ruler and a 
kingmaker. 
And yet, if democracy located the move away from divine rule in the equality of 
individuals, antidemocratic ideas also evolved with the onset of modernity. Some strains, 
such as communism, had clear ideological components, while the ideology of autocracy 
was more subtle in other variants, such as some branches of fascism. They are united, 
however, by their universal paternalism. Far from democracy's advocacy for liberty and 
equality, antidemocracy baldly proclaims, "Father knows best." While for communism 
this was to be a time delimited phase (one from which it never experientially escaped, 
whatever the ideology), the fact remains that all antidemocratic sentiment unites in its 
fundamental assumption that "the many" cannot govern themselves into a better 
existence. When democracy fails, paternalism invariably wins. The age old critiques of 
democracy as Utopian and unstable and of "the many" as incompetent are recycled as 
democratic failure permeates the international system. 
Much is explained by the varying historical context of CW1 compared to CW2. 
The first counterwave, 1922-1940, was a true battleground of ideas. Fascism, with its 
strongly centralized form of governance, was on the march, offering stability in an 
uncertain time. Communism, on the other hand, was often what sparked fascism's 
advance. Reacting against the purely revolutionary zeal of a fundamentally socially 
destabilizing ideology, fascism's stability seemed preferable to democracy's weakness, 
which after all allowed communists freedom of even vitriolic speech, especially in light 
of the post-conflict challenges of World War I and the economic depression that had 
gripped the world. The first counterwave occurred in the midst of great uncertainty at a 
time when democracy seemed not to know the right answers. Of course, Hitler's 
aggressive march across Europe, taking over high level democracies hand over fist, 
contributed a great deal. Still, the first counterwave went beyond Europe's borders, as 
Latin American democracies also took a nosedive toward fascism. 
The second counterwave, 1957-1977, reflected more uncertainty in the 
international system, again in the context of competing ideologies. The conclusion of 
World War II set off a process whereby former colonies clamored for independence. 
This was most pronounced in Africa and Southeast Asia. These newly independent 
colonies embarked on a struggle for national identity in a bipolar world. On one side 
were the colonizers of the West, on the other an upstart power with a new identity but a 
long history. Dividing the globe between them, these 2 poles held vastly different 
ideologies. The Soviet Union was evangelistic in it support of spreading communism. 
Gladly lending a hand in the inculcation of communism to the masses, the U.S.S.R. held 
newly independent nations in their tutelage, even when it did not absorb them entirely. 
On the other hand, the West (represented largely by the United States) took a different 
approach. Instead of supporting new democracies, the West committed to defending 
existing ones. The drawbridge was raised, and while those inside democracy's castle 
were to be defended, it was not the time to sally forth and spread democracy. Ironically, 
democracy's strongest governments believed some of the time honored critiques about 
her.. .namely, that democracy is an unstable and Utopian entity in times of uncertainty. In 
other words, democracy is not for everybody at every time. Instead, autocrats with 
friendly dispositions toward Western interests were cultivated while democratic 
movements were squelched.1 The light of confidence in the democratic ideal burned 
dimly even in high level Western democracies during the second counterwave. 
Collectively, a defensive stance was taken as the threat of communism loomed large and 
Western nations seemed ill-equipped to deal with the challenge. 
1
 Nick Culather, Secret History: The CIA 's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala 1952-1954 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
Summary of Findings 
This work's primary intent has been to describe the macro level trends of 
democratic failure, a topic that has received scant attention. While others have described 
the challenges facing nations who commit to this process of moving toward democracy, 
the impact of backward movement resembles a little studied whirlpool. Its impact on the 
collective ship of state has not been adequately uncovered. This study, while not 
addressing all of the complexities, has put this water feature on the map. It has done so in 
2 ways, by looking at the clustering of democratic failure across time as well as by 
examining democracy in different concentrations. In this final chapter, I will first 
summarize the main findings, discuss the implications of this work and then suggest 
directions of fruitful future research. 
The counterwaves 
The counterwave time periods, 1921-1940 (CW1) and 1957-1977 (CW2), were 
clusters of antidemocratic sentiment, times when the world system rejected the 
democratic ideal, instead being lulled by the siren song of autocracy. This is true of all 
polity types, as all levels of democracy experienced failure while autocracies deepened. 
Failures within the counterwaves were deep, occurred quickly, and more typically 
consisted of regime change as opposed to internal repression. The time that it took for 
the failures to occur was similar inside and outside the counterwaves, but the peak level 
of failure was steeper inside the counterwave than for failures that occurred outside the 
counterwaves. 
The counterwaves were a widespread geographic phenomenon. This is especially 
true when looking at those nations that experienced negative polity change within the 
counterwave time bands, but holds true as well for those who reached failure threshold. 
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Looking at the global nature of the counterwaves again buttresses the argument that these 
are systemic phenomena. When looking at the percentages of total failures that occurred 
within the counterwaves, 61% of all high level democratic failures occurred within these 
time bands. At the other end of the spectrum are autocratic deepenings, with 40% of all 
autocratic deepenings occurring within the counterwave years. From high level 
democratic failure all the way down to autocratic deepening, a striking number of failures 
occurred within the counterwaves, justifying the statement that these time bands truly 
were the ebb of democracy's flow. 
When comparing the 2 counterwaves, there are important similarities and 
differences. The composition is strikingly similar, as far as universality of impact on all 
types of polities. The geography, however, is somewhat different. The epicenter for the 
first counterwave was Europe (19 failures), but antidemocratic sentiment reverberated to 
Latin America (14 failures), Africa (2 failures), and the Middle East (1 failure). In fact, 
of all the existent democracies in 1921 only 25% would avoid failure during the first 
counterwave. CW1 was particularly harsh for high level democracies. While no new 
high level democracies were born during the first counterwave, well over half the world's 
high level democracies failed during this time band. 
The epicenter for the second counterwave was Africa (27 failures), but its reach 
was more global. As new nation states had been born through the process of 
decolonization, the number of democracies in the world system rose as well. 
Democracy's forward momentum foundered in the second counterwave, as democratic 
failure swept through Latin America (15 failures), Asia (15 failures), the Middle East (11 
failures) and even Europe (7 failures). While the impact of the second counterwave was 
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not so catastrophic on democracy's birth rate, the taint still remained. Democracies were 
born during the counterwave, but they faced a future of failure more often than not. 
Not only was the geography different for the counterwaves, there were distinctly 
different mechanisms of failure as well. The first counterwave featured a clear external 
component, with external takeovers being the highest of any time in history. In contrast, 
during the second counterwave coups were the clear dominant mechanism, across all 
types of democratic failure. 
In addition, there were varying changes in autocracy. During the first 
counterwave, there was a spike in high level autocracy. Also of note, in evaluating the 
toxicity of the first counterwave to democracy, no high level democracies were born in 
this time band. In contrast, during the second counterwave, the spike occurred not in 
high level autocracy but in mid-level autocracy. High level democracies were born 
during this time span, although these nation states also seem tainted by their birth time 
since 61% of the high level democracies born during the second counterwave had failed 
by 2006. Both the degree of spike in autocracy and the birth rate of high level 
democracies point to the different impact of the second counterwave when compared to 
the first. In a real sense, the second counterwave appears to be less toxic to democracy 
than the first. 
These points of contrast offer interesting implications. The first counterwave, at 
first glance, seems more toxic. In one sense, this is true when considering factors like the 
spike in high level autocracy and the complete lack of new high level democracies. What 
the second counterwave lacked in comparative depth, a minor distinction to be sure since 
the failures were still very deep, it made up for in breadth. One might add that the second 
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counterwave has also highlighted more intractable issues for democratic failure. While 
those nation states in the first counterwave are now strikingly democratic, those in the 
second counterwave still face significant challenges. 
All of this analysis points to the distinctiveness of the counterwave time periods. 
They are times when democracies experienced failures and when autocracies deepened as 
well. They also offer compelling evidence that democratic failure, far from being an 
isolated internal event, has been tied to macro processes in the international system, a 
concept that deserves much more attention and in-depth analysis from scholars. 
Repeat offenders and durability 
The counterwaves feature democratic failure and autocratic deepening with a 
wide geographic scope. While the geographic epicenter shifted from Europe to Africa, a 
significant subset of nation states experienced a significant drop in polity score in both 
counterwaves. South America, significant portions of Europe, and Central America, 
were impacted by CW1 and CW2. Significant portions of these regions experienced 
failure multiple times. 
Repeat offenders in democratic failure are not confined solely to the counterwave 
years. In looking through a wider lens at the issue of a nation's repeated attempts at 
democratic governance, we find a stunning number impacted by repeated democratic 
failure. Of the 148 incidences of democratic failure from 1800-2006, 100 are incidences 
of democratic failure by repeat offenders. Of even more concern for democracy 
advocates, repeat offenders permeate every level of democracy. In other words, 
achieving high level democracy is no guarantee that a nation state will be freed from a 
history of repeated democratic failure. Greece, Pakistan, Lesotho, Turkey, and France 
are just some of the examples of high level democracies that have experienced multiple 
democratic failures. 
To further demonstrate the dominance of repeated democratic failure, we can look 
at the destiny of the 48 nation states that only experienced democratic failure once. Of 
those 48, 15 did not repeat democratic failure because they never recovered any level of 
democracy. For these nation states, democratic failure plunged them into autocracy from 
which they had not emerged by 2006. 
These overwhelmingly high numbers of nation states that fail, then recover 
democracy, then fail again would seem to reinforce the historic concerns about 
democracy's stability. Of great concern is the durability of mid-level and low level 
democracy. Few are the historic cases of these lower concentrations of democracy 
serving as temporary stopping off places on the road to high level democracies. Instead, 
especially since the onset of CW2 in 1957, low level and mid-level democracies have 
demonstrated an alarming lack of durability. Of course, not all democracies have 
experienced failure. In particular, level 10 democracies have proven resilient to many 
challenges. Mitigating this optimism, however, is the fact that only 5 non-Western, non-
island countries have reached this threshold. 
Still, the overall durability of the very highest level democracy brings some 
comfort to democracy advocates. In addition, democracies of all levels have historically 
seen lower numbers of severe disturbances than their autocratic counterparts. When it 
comes to external takeovers, civil wars, and the descent into failed states, autocracies 
have outnumbered their democratic counterparts. However, democratic failures 
experience a uniform volatility that is of great concern. 
Fast and far 
The findings for democratic failure vary across high level, mid-level and low 
level democracy, but some findings unite democratic failure in all its manifestations. 
These statements are true within the counterwave years, and outside of them as well. 
When they fail, democracies overwhelmingly fail fast and far. This statement is true for 
high level democratic failure, where a slow gradual decline was rare. Mid-level failures 
feature the most precipitous decline as a polity type, although all 3 concentrations of 
democracy failed an average of a year to a year and a half. This is in stark contrast to 
autocratic deepening, which took an average of twice as long to drop 3 polity points, as 
can be seen in Table 8. 
Table 8. Average years taken to reach failure threshold 
POLITY TYPE 
High Level Democracy 
Mid Level Democracy 
Low Level Democracy 
Autocracy 





Not only do democracies of all concentrations fail quickly, they also fail deeply. 
As can be seen in Table 9, the average democratic failure for high level, mid-level and 
low level democracies was enough to take all types of democracy over into autocracy. 
Democratic failure, then, has not been prone to a slow erosion of democratic institutions. 
Across time and across polity type, democratic failure has been both precipitous and 
deep. This is true especially within the counterwaves, when the depth of the failures is 
deepest. 
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Table 9. Average depth of failure for all types of democracy 
POLITY TYPE 
High Level Democracy 
Mid-Level Democracy 
Low Level Democracy 




Mechanism of failure 
Adding further to the understanding of democracy's vulnerability is the 
mechanism of democratic failure. There are 4 basic ways that democratic failures occur: 
civil war, external takeover, internal repression and coup. Of course, the context to each 
of these occurrences is complex and would serve as a rich arena for further research. 
Still, even from this cursory look, important similarities and differences emerge, as 
shown in Graph 17. 
If we look simply at high level democratic failures, we find the dominant 
mechanism of democratic failure is different for each time band considered. In the first 
counterwave, external takeovers predominate, echoing the historical context of Hitler's 
march through Europe. During the second counterwave, coups are the dominant 
mechanism of failure. Again, this is shaped by the historical context of instability during 
the decolonization time span that took place within a bipolar world that was quite hostile 
to new democracies. Outside the counterwaves, internal repression becomes the leading 
mechanism for high level democratic failure. High level democracy, then, has had 
varying points of vulnerability depending on the historical context. 
Dissonant democracy has more consistent vulnerabilities. For mid-level democracy, 
coups predominate regardless of time band. Low level democracy also shows real 
2
 It would be interesting to push the research in the direction of greater statistical analysis. This could be 
achieved simply by looking at multiple regressions that examine the relationship of legislative deadlock 
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Graph 17. Mechanisms of failure for all types of democracy. 
vulnerability to coups as the dominant mechanism of failure during the second 
counterwave, as is true of both high level democratic failure and mid level democratic 
failure for this same time period. Outside of CW2, low level democratic failure is split 
almost evenly between coups and internal repression. 
One further point, regarding the mechanisms of failure, is the concentration of 
civil war. While civil war is not a dominant mechanism of democratic failure at any 
point of time, it does occur in greater concentrations at certain times. For example, in the 
first counterwave more than 10% of mid level democratic failures were due to civil war. 
and propensity to move toward democratic failure via each of the mechanisms. There are, of course, many 


















Graph 18. Polity type as percentage of world system. 
For the second counterwave, this is true of high level democracies. Outside the 
counterwaves, low level democracies are the most prone to civil war. These varying 
mechanisms point to certain characteristics of democracy's vulnerability, a topic which 
leads us to ponder the implications of all the findings in this study. 
Implications 
There have been significant changes in the world system from the beginning of 
the study in 1800, until its end in 2006. As shown in Graph 18, the dominant polity types 
have shifted dramatically over the course of the time studied. In 1800, high level 
autocracy was the dominant polity type, with mid level autocracy close behind. High and 
mid-level democracy was non-existent, and low level democracy was the choice of 
governance for less than 10% of the nation states in the world system. In direct contrast, 
in the year 2006, over 40% of the nation states in the world system are some type of 
democracy, with high level democracy as the dominant share. High and low level 
autocracy has faded into near oblivion. Of greater concern, however, to democracy 
advocates is the utter resilience of mid-level autocracy across the entire time span under 
study. While high level autocracy has decreased its market share dramatically, mid-level 
autocracy remains stubbornly viable. 
It is clear that democracy's victory is far from complete. The majority of nation 
states in the world system still live under some sort of autocracy, while only roughly a 
quarter of all nation states experience high level democracy. This study also implies the 
tenuous nature of democracy's gains. Democracy's rapid and deep failures, both within 
the counterwave years and outside these time bands, countenance caution. 
This study has also highlighted the importance of studying democratic failure at 
the macro level of analysis. Without analysis at the systemic level, clusters of democratic 
failure and autocratic deepening are impossible to recognize. The toxicity of these time 
bands to democracy is impossible to detect if democratic failure is analyzed solely by a 
case study approach. 
In addition, while much has been made in the case study approach to democratic 
failure of the complexities of the internal political environment, little attention has 
focused on the impact of the international environment. The counterwaves suggest 
system wide disturbances in the power of the democratic ideal. The impact of 
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fluctuations in the international economic environment, the role of conflict and post-
conflict rebuilding efforts, and the arena of state-building are just a few fruitful arenas to 
examine more closely in future academic examinations of the counterwave phenomena 
and democratic failure in general. With the descriptive work of this study completed, a 
next step could begin the work of looking for correlations. Key to all of this is the 
interaction of the international system, the nation state, and local actors. 
Certainly democratic failure is usually intimately tied to the internal environment 
of a nation state, but even this is not universal. As we have seen in the case of external 
takeovers, democratic failure can occur simply with an external takeover. While the 
viability of externally "imposed" democracy has been a controversial topic, who would 
argue that democratic failure can only happen with internal elements? Hitler put such 
arguments to rest with some finality. 
Even in a world with Hitler safely dead, important changes have occurred that 
point to a greater role for forces external to the nation state. The world in which we live 
is different in some fundamental ways. There are at least 3 important ways that life in the 
twenty first century is different. 
First of all, the speed of life is different. Information is relayed with lightning 
speed, on news outlets, via the internet, and through instant messages. In this age of 
information transference, will there also be a more easily transferred political agenda? 
Will the instability in one nation have greater spillage across borders and even across 
continents? If democracy fails in one state, will another state be less likely to attempt 
reform? If democracy breaks out in one nation will a neighboring autocratic nation take 
repressive steps to shore up its rule, in a sort of anticipatory reaction? 
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The second point, then, is that events occur before an audience. Now, more than 
ever, there concept of a global stage is reality. In some sense, since democracy's victory 
with the fall of the Soviet Union, this has largely worked to constrain behavior. In the 
post-Tiananmen Square world, we've seen peaceful transitions where in the past military 
force would have been a more likely scenario, such as in the Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia.3 
This is likely due to the third point, which is that democracy now has normative 
power in the international system. While democracy has not dominated all nation states, 
in some sense even dictators feel constrained to pay it lip service, in a way that never 
occurred in the past. 
What do we do with these differences? Do we, then, discount the idea of 
antidemocratic clusters as something consigned to the past? Is democracy's victory so 
permanent that we need not concern ourselves with democratic decline as rapid and 
steep? Will democracy as a force in the international system mitigate against precipitous 
democratic failures? There is certainly no evidence of this in the cases of more recent 
democratic failures, such as Thailand, Fiji, Nepal and Guinea-Bissau. There may, 
however, be an argument that the democratic norm has had a mitigating effect on those 
nation states that are more constrained by the international system, such as Venezuela and 
Russia, who have indeed experienced a slower decline in polity scores. 
As the democratic ideal has so forcefully demonstrated, norms are not static in the 
international system. If the dramatic transitions of 1989-1991 demonstrated anything 
they demonstrated that norms can change rapidly. There are big players, especially 
3
 Unfortunately, as of this writing, democracy is far from certain in either of these examples. If anything, 
they seem likely to serve as future case studies for democratic failure. 
Russia and China, in the international system whose commitment to democratic 
governance flies in the face of the democratic norm. China especially, if it manages to 
overcome the challenges of the remnants of its state economy, could be poised to offer an 
alternative to high level democracy. 
This, of course, takes us back to the idea that ideas matter. Whether you think of 
them as causative agents of change, or merely as indicators of the convergence of forces 
already at work, ideas serve as signposts signaling change. The counterwave years were 
times of uncertainty and of the competition of conflicting ideas. During the first 
counterwave, democracy retreated to fascism in the fight against communism. In the 
second counterwave, democracy opted for a containment policy. While the traditional 
way to view this is a containment of communism, in reality this was also a containment 
of democracy. In the face of an external threat, democracy saved itself in the countries 
where it already thrived, but refused to do battle with antidemocratic ideas elsewhere, all 
in the name of self-preservation. 
In an increasingly complex world, where does that leave us in our thoughts about 
democratic failure? Count me with the group of scholars who study political structure 
but aver prophecy, an inherently risky business. Few are proven correct, many are 
proven wrong. Alexis de Tocqueville, in the early nineteenth century, predicted the rise 
of the United States and Russia as 2 superpowers that would be fundamentally different 
in nature yet "marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe."4 
We admire Tocqueville's prescience. On the other hand, Nikita Khrushchev published an 
article in Foreign Affairs in 1959 predicting the triumph of socialism as practiced in the 
4
 As quoted in Arendt Lipjhart's World Politics: The Writings of Theorists and Practitioners, Classical 
and Modern (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), 432. 
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Soviet Union as the system of governance that "will be victorious on the globe which will 
offer the nations greater opportunities for improving their material and spiritual life." As I 
venture where angels fear to tread, I hope to be a Tocqueville and not a Khrushchev. 
Regardless of the dangers, some words contemplating the future direction of democracy 
and democratic failure are in order. 
The euphoria that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, has itself collapsed. 
While optimism about reshaping the globe has fallen flat, confidence in autocracy and 
managed governance has re-emerged. How will democracy respond to new challenges 
and evolutions? In the past, when hope has been low in the international system, 
democracy has suffered. Navigating the waters full of the shipwrecks of post-conflict 
time periods has been especially difficult for democracy. Scholars have now broadly 
concluded that the third wave of democracy is over. Meanwhile, democratic governance 
has not proven to be the panacea to either poverty in Africa or the key to political 
stability in that region. In spite of the gains made by democracy in Latin America, grave 
concerns remain about democracy's viability in that region as well.6 Post-Soviet states 
have inherited problems that democracy has not been able to entirely resolve. 
Significant portions of the globe remain under the sway of autocracy, especially in the 
Middle East, Africa and Asia. It is unclear, with the loss of the democratization 
momentum, that autocracy will retreat in the near future, but with the increasingly 
5
 Larry Diamond, "Universal Democracy?" Policy Review 119 (June 2003): 3-25; Jason Brownlee, "Low 
Tide after the Third Wave: Exploring Politics under Authoritarianism," Comparative Politics 34, no. 4 
(July 2002): 477-498; Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" Journal of Democracy 7, no. 3 (July 
1996): 20-37. 
6
 Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds. Issues in Democratic 
Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame, 1992). 
7
 Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the 
Post-Communist World," World Politics 52, no. 2 (January 2002): 212-244. 
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complex world democracy inhabits there is reason for concern about a third counterwave. 
This is particularly troubling, since recent studies have linked the concept of diffusion not 
Q 
only to democracy, but also to democratic failure. I hope this assessment will prove to 
be unduly grim. Whatever democracy's future, it will certainly be informed by the 
failures in democracy's past. 
8
 D. Brinks and M. Coppedge, "Diffusion is no Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of 
Democracy," Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 4 (May 2006): 463-489. 
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